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“Essentially, the theory of probability is nothing but good common 
sense reduced to mathematics. It provides an exact appreciation of 
what sound minds feel with a kind of instinct, frequently without 
being able to account for it.” 
Pierre Simon Laplace (1749-1827) (1) 
 
 
Bayes’ ……..“crack cocaine of statistics…. Seductive, addictive and 
ultimately destructive”  
An unknown Google representative who recruited Bayesians for 
Google (2) 
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Abstract 
The objective of this study was to investigate the effects of circularity, comorbidity, prevalence and 
presentation variation on the accuracy of differential diagnoses made in optometric primary care 
using a modified form of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis. No such investigation has ever been 
reported before. 
Data were collected for 1422 cases seen over one year. Positive test outcomes were recorded for 
case history (ethnicity, age, symptoms and ocular and medical history) and clinical signs in relation to 
each diagnosis. For this reason only positive likelihood ratios were used for this modified form of 
Bayesian analysis that was carried out with Laplacian correction and Chi-square filtration. Accuracy 
was expressed as the percentage of cases for which the diagnoses made by the clinician appeared at 
the top of a list generated by Bayesian analysis.  
Preliminary analyses were carried out on 10 diagnoses and 15 test outcomes. Accuracy of 100% was 
achieved in the absence of presentation variation but dropped by 6% when variation existed. 
Circularity artificially elevated accuracy by 0.5%. Surprisingly, removal of Chi-square filtering 
increased accuracy by 0.4%. Decision tree analysis showed that accuracy was influenced primarily by 
prevalence followed by presentation variation and comorbidity.  
Analysis of 35 diagnoses and 105 test outcomes followed. This explored the use of positive likelihood 
ratios, derived from the case history, to recommend signs to look for. Accuracy of 72% was achieved 
when all clinical signs were entered. The drop in accuracy, compared to the preliminary analysis, was 
attributed to the fact that some diagnoses lacked strong diagnostic signs; the accuracy increased by 
1% when only recommended signs were entered. Chi-square filtering improved recommended test 
selection. Decision tree analysis showed that accuracy again influenced primarily by prevalence, 
followed by comorbidity and presentation variation.    
Future work will explore the use of likelihood ratios based on positive and negative test findings prior 
to considering naïve Bayesian analysis as a form of artificial intelligence in optometric practice. 
(key words: Bayesian; clinical decision making; likelihood ratios; differential diagnosis; epidemiology; 
optometry; primary care;) 
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Glossary  
Definitions of terms as used within the context of this study 
 
algorithm a sequence of steps in order to solve a problem 
ban Probability expressed in logarithm to the base 10 to ease calculations 
(introduced by  Alan Turing). 
Bayesian network  a graphical model representing the probabilities and their relationships  
Chi-square filtering Chi-square test is used to test the strength between a test item and  the 
condition being tested. Filtering is carried out by using only strong 
associations (determined by by a Chi-square value that ensured that 
there would be no false positives errors), so that weak or spurious 
associations are not used in the naïve Bayesian analysis 
circularity testing of the Bayesian analysis using the same data that was used 
determine the prevalence and build the likelihood ratios in the first place   
comorbidity the coexistence of more than one eye condition or disease in the same 
individual  
decision matrix  is a table of rows and columns containing data that allows the analysis of 
the data and determine their relationships. In this study, only 2x2 
decision matrices have been used, that is 2 rows by 2 columns. Decision 
matrices are also known  as contingency tables 
decision tree analysis a method of multivariate analysis that is used to classify statistical data in 
hierarchical manner, with the ability to handle both discrete and 
continuous variables.  
diagnosis an eye disease or condition 
frequentist statistical 
theory 
the drawing of conclusions from sample data  with emphasis on the 
frequencies of the data, using hypothesis testing and confidence intervals 
to see how well the sample represents the population. 
Gibbs sampling  a form of Monte Carlo sampling based on Markov chains  
heuristic  enabling a person to discover or learn for themselves  
kappa  is an agreement coefficient statistic used to measure the agreement 
between tests which has been corrected for agreements achieved by 
chance. Maximum value of kappa is 1 which achieved when there is 
perfect agreement.  
kappa - weighted,   (kr) is where cells in the decision matrix are weighted according to their 
importance after which the kappa coefficient is applied. When the 
weighting "r"  =1 , this gives kappa value for a screening test, that is 
sensitivity is maximised. For r=0, kappa value is for a diagnostic test, that 
is specificity is maximised; when r=0.5, both sensitivity and specificity are 
given equal importance and false positives and false negatives are 
minimised.  
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Glossary –Cont. 
likelihood ratio - positive the ratio of sensitivity to the false positive error rate LR+ = sensitivity/ (1-
specificity) 
likelihood ratio- negative the ratio of the false negative error to specificity  LR- = (1-sensitivity)/ 
specificity 
Markov Chain a stochastic process in which future states are independent of past states 
given the present state 
MCMC A combination of Markov chains and Monte Carlo methods 
Monte Carlo  a computer generated simulation of a probability distribution by taking 
random samples  
naïve Bayesian analysis Bayesian analysis which assumes that all tests items are independent of 
each other, and test outcomes are independent of other test outcomes.  
naïve Bayesian sequential 
analysis 
in the context of this study, naïve Bayesian analysis with a continuous 
input of data, altering outcomes with the input of new data where the 
order of new data being applied to the analysis is not of significance 
odds - post test the odds of the condition being  present after a  test outcome.  If the test 
outcome is positive, then Post-test odds = Pre-test odds x positive 
likelihood ratio . If however the  test outcome is negative, then Post-test 
odds = Pre-test odds x negative likelihood ratio 
odds - pre-test the odds of the condition being present prior to testing.  Pre-test 
odds=pre-test probability/ (1- pre-test probability)  
ophthalmic procedure examination of a particular structure (e.g. cornea or optic disc) or 
measurement (e.g. intraocular pressure or fixation disparity)  
predictive value - negative proportion of people who with a negative test outcome who do not have 
the condition 
predictive value - positive proportion of people with a positive test outcome who actually have the 
condition  
presentation variation  the difference between observed clinical data and expected "textbook" 
data 
prevalence the ratio of the number cases showing that particular diagnosis  to the 
total number of cases.  
priors - equal equal probability is assigned as the pre-test probability as previous data 
to relating this diagnosis is vague and inconclusive  
priors - subjective where the pre-test probability is based on a persons belief  as opposed to 
being based on previous data 
priors - unequal unequal probability is assigned to the pre-test probability when there is 
previous informative data  relating to the diagnosis, that is, the 
prevalence.  
priors -objective where the pre-test probability is based on previous data 
probabilities (post-test) is the probabilty of the diagnosis after the application of the test  
probabilities (pre-test)  is the prevalence of the diagnosis in practice 
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Glossary - Cont. 
QROC is a graphical plot of the weighted kappa k1 to k0 .   The weighted kappa 
represent "quality indices" in an ROC curve (therefore QROC)  
receiver operator 
characteristic (ROC)  curve  
a graphical plot of the true positive rate against the false positive rate 
that is sensitivity against (1-specificity)  for different pass/fail criteria. 
ROC curves are used to determine optimal models for decision making  
recommended tests following history and symptoms, the post-test odds determine the 6 most 
likely diagnosis. Recommended tests are those which would then confirm 
the diagnosis, and these are those test items that have the highest 
positive likelihood ratios indicating a strong test item/ condition 
association. 
sampling  using a finite number of observations to learn about a much larger 
population  
sensitivity  proportion of people with a condition who will have a positive test 
outcome   
sequential analysis   a continuous analysis of data; essentially analysing new data as it arrives 
whilst taking into account previous data. 
specificiity proportion of people without the condition who will have a negative test 
outcome  
statistical inference drawing conclusions from data using statistical methods 
stochastic  of or pertaining to a process involving a randomly determined sequence 
of observations each of which is considered as a sample of one element 
from a probability distribution.  
test item  any clinical recording that can provide information to aid/improve 
diagnosis  (such as  ocular or medical history demographics, presenting 
symptoms, clinical signs )  
test outcome the test outcome is whether or not a test item is present or absent 
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1. Introduction  
This chapter briefly sets the stage for the research presented in this thesis before describing the 
scope of the study and an outline of what each chapter covers.   
 
1.1 Global Action Plan 2014-2019  
In May 2013, the World Health Assembly approved the Global 
Action Plan (GAP) for the Prevention of Avoidable Blindness 
and Visual Impairment 2014-2019 (3). This supersedes the 
Vision 2020, the Right to Sight (4) (5), public health initiative of 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the members of the 
International Agency for the Prevention of Blindness (IAPB). 
The goal of the GAP is to “reduce avoidable visual impairment 
and to secure rehabilitation services for the visually impaired”.  
The GAP purpose is to achieve this goal by improving access to 
comprehensive eye care services which are a part of a general 
health system.  This will be achieved by  
 Collecting epidemiological evidence 
 Training more eye health professionals 
 Provide comprehensive eye care  
According to the WHO and IAPB (4) (5) about 285 million 
people in the world today are estimated to be visually 
impaired. Of these, 39 million are estimated to be blind.  Of all 
the people that are visually impaired, it is estimated that 80% are due to preventable causes.  The 
United Republic of Tanzania became a signatory in 2003 and is currently running its 2nd Strategic Plan 
(6). The summary of the GAP is shown in Figure 2 
  
Figure 1 From Vision 2020- The Right 
to Sight to the Global Action Plan 
2014-2019 
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Figure 2 A summary of the Global action Plan 2014 -2019: Aims and Objectives 
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1.2 The need for effective differential diagnosis   
Eye disease is most likely to be detected first in the primary care setting during routine eye 
examinations. Failure to detect early eye disease leads, at best, to the need for more sophisticated 
and costly secondary care treatments and, at worst, to avoidable loss of vision that brings with it 
other socioeconomic costs (7). On the other hand, unnecessary referrals lead to overburdening of 
secondary eye care services (8). This potentially leads to delivery of suboptimal treatment in 
overstretched hospitals. Effective and timely referral between eye care professionals can ensure the 
best treatment possible, and efficient use of costly secondary care resources (9).  
Primary care optometrists are therefore an essential part of the strategy to eliminate avoidable 
blindness and the consequences of sight threatening conditions can be limited if optometrists make a 
timely diagnosis and manage eye disease appropriately. 
There are currently only about 190 registered optometrists in Tanzania (10), serving a population of 
43 million people (11), (12). Efforts are being made to increase the manpower and the level of clinical 
training. However, one of the consequences of this shortage in man power is that Tanzanian 
optometrists are frequently called upon to make clinical decisions that extend beyond their training.  
In the UK, there is a different kind of pressure. Commercial pressure to reduce chair time (13) puts 
the optometrist at risk of not detecting sight threatening conditions in time due to a lack of clinical 
vigilance. Clinical vigilance guided by the recognition of symptoms and signs is important for making 
accurate diagnoses and the most appropriate referrals (14).  
Poor record keeping and missed diagnoses can be a potential minefield for any optometrist, with 
possibly severe legal implications. Computerised record keeping systems ensure comprehensive and 
legible records, but currently lack artificial intelligence.  
 
1.3 Scope of the present study 
This thesis explores the factors influencing the accuracy of a modified form of naïve Bayesian 
sequential analysis as a means of providing artificial intelligence for making differential diagnoses and 
selecting diagnostic tests. As far as its author is aware, the investigations described in this study have 
never appeared in the ophthalmic literature before now. 
Chapter 2 introduces Bayes’ theorem from an historical perspective. Chapter 3 provides worked 
examples to demonstrate the simplicity of naïve Bayesian calculations and the theoretical influence 
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on its accuracy of factors such as prevalence, comorbidity, presentation variation and circularity. The 
use of the Laplacian correction, Chi-square filtration and sequential analysis are also discussed in 
chapter 3. Chapter 4 covers the methodology of the preliminary and main studies of this thesis. 
Chapter 5 presents the findings of a preliminary study designed to determine the influence of 
circularity, prevalence, comorbidity, presentation variation and Chi-square filtering on the accuracy of 
naïve Bayesian sequential analysis applied to a small group of diagnoses, each of which had at least 
one definitive diagnostic test outcome. Chapter 6 shows the findings of the main study designed to 
re-examine the influence of prevalence, comorbidity, presentation variation and Chi-square filtering 
on the accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis applied to a larger group of diagnoses, some of 
which did not necessarily have definitive diagnostic tests outcomes. The use of positive likelihood 
ratios to identify diagnostic tests was also explored in chapter 6. Chapter 7 summarises the findings of 
this thesis and makes recommendations for future study. 
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2. Bayes’ Theorem 
This chapter introduces the 250 year old history of Bayes’ theorem and presents a brief overview of 
its applications to date in ophthalmic research. 
   
2.1 What is Bayes’ theorem? 
Thomas Bayes’, a mathematician and theologian who lived in the 18th century, proposed a 
mathematical basis for the change in probability of an event following new evidence (15) (16) . The 
concept of Bayes’ theorem is simple: An initial belief (referred to as a prior probability or just a prior 
or, in the clinical context, a pre-test probability) is altered by new evidence (that may be expressed in 
terms of a likelihood ratio) to give a new and improved belief (posterior probability or, in the clinical 
context, a post-test probability).  
Systems that apply Bayes’ theorem are not only relatively simple but can self-learn, leading closer and 
closer to certainty as more data is entered (2) (17). Bayesian models also have the ability to self-
correct; that is, when the inputted data changes, the model changes to accommodate the new data 
(18). 
 
2.2 Early History of Bayes’ Theorem 
Bayes’ Theorem has had a turbulent history since its first emergence in 1763. Thomas Bayes was very 
much involved with the issues of the early 18th century, and although he only published one paper 
during his lifetime, defending and explaining Newton’s theory of calculus (19) (20), he was an active 
member of an informal group that peer reviewed other mathematicians’ papers. Bayes’ work was 
known to have been influenced by Richard Price (who edited and posthumously published the work 
of Thomas Bayes (15)), Jakob Bernoulli, Abraham de Moivre and possibly also the philosopher David 
Hume (21). Bayes provided a reasoned argument for inference from observed frequencies to 
unknown probabilities (that is, from effect to cause), something also, independently, worked on by 
Pierre Simon Laplace (22). This was the inverse of the Bernoulli theorem and de Moivre’s theory 
(from cause to effect (23)). Bayes assumed equal priors, which would be modified on collection of 
further data.  
Across the English Channel in France, the prediction of the return of Halley’s Comet by French 
scientists of the time convinced Laplace that natural events could be revealed by mathematics. 
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Laplace was, like Bayes, influenced by de Moivre’s work on probability. In the mid-18th century, 
probability was mainly applied to gambling, assessing situations of commercial risk, and philosophical 
questions such as the existence of God. Laplace presented his paper “Memoire on the Probability of 
Causes given Events” in 1773 (22). This was the very first expression of Bayesian statistical inference. 
Initially Laplace assigned equal priors to his theory but later amended it to include unequal priors. 
Laplace then used this theory in demography and judicial reform before applying it to studies of 
astronomy, the tides and barometric pressure.  
During Laplace’s lifetime, and immediately afterwards, the thirst for facts grew, whether they were 
birth statistics, the number of crimes in a city, the number of undelivered letters in the Paris post 
office, or the number of cholera cases. These were then used to make decisions in government and 
other institutions. As the number of facts grew the need for Bayesian analysis, (which worked well in 
the face of uncertainty), diminished and frequency analysis (which worked better when hard facts 
were available) took over in the latter half of the 19th Century.  
 
2.3 The Early 20th Century 
Joseph Bertrand (24) used Bayes’ theorem to assist the French army artillery to improve their 
performance. Bertrand advocated the strict use of equal priors only when they were truly equal or 
when there was actually no prior information. Bertrand’s textbooks and methods were used by both 
the French and Russian military. At that time, all the judiciary attended military school and had 
studied Bayes’ theorem from Bertrand’s textbooks. When Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish French army 
officer, was convicted of spying for the Germans his defence lawyer requested the assistance of Henri 
Poincare who used Bayes’ theorem to dismiss a letter presented by the prosecution as forgery thus 
exonerating Dreyfus (25). 
In 1907, Bell Telephones Systems was facing financial collapse. A financial plan to make the company 
more economically viable, based on Bayes’ theorem by Edward Molina, helped Bell to convince a 
banking consortium, led by the House of Morgan, to give financial support crucial for Bell’s survival 
(26) (27).  
In another important development, in the early 20th century, legislative changes were introduced in 
the United States which required employers to provide employees with occupational injury and 
illness insurance. Thus insurance premiums had to be formulated for a wide variety of circumstances. 
Isaac Rubinow, working for the American Medical Association, collated insurance claims from all over 
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the world to give the prior information in order to set premiums (28) (29) (30). Whitney in 1918 
formulated the credibility theory for the insurance industry based on Bayes’ theorem.  
Although Bayes’ theorem was being used by the military and many other disciplines, statisticians 
were being strongly influenced by the theories of Karl Pearson and Ronald Fisher in the early 1920’s.  
Pearson and Fisher promoted the frequentist theories for statistics, condemning Bayes’ theorem, and 
introduced sampling theory, tests of significance, analysis of variance and experimental design 
methods. Fisher redefined uncertainty, not by probability but by relative frequency (31) (32) (33) (34). 
Egon Pearson (the son of Karl Pearson) used both Bayes’ theorem and Fisher’s frequentist statistical 
theories to advance statistical theoretical work (35). Egon Pearson then teamed with Jerzy Neyman to 
develop the Neyman-Pearson theory of hypothesis testing (36). Fisher and Neyman were staunch 
anti-Bayesians and their influence prevented the use and the advancement of Bayes’ theorem in 
statistics for almost 50 years. Their objection to Bayes’ theorem was mainly due to the fact that the 
priors being used were subjective, that is that the prior probability was determined according to an 
individual’s “personal belief” and was subject to great variation. However, they found it acceptable to 
use Bayes’ theorem when prior probabilities were “objective” that is, the prior probabilities were 
based on previous data, or on a collective rather than individual belief. 
Around the same time, in the 1920’s, three people (Emile Borel, Frank Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti) 
independently came to the conclusion that a person’s subjective belief could be quantified by the 
amount that he was willing to bet (as in a horse in a race, for example). This was an important step 
forward for Bayes’ theorem, in that the controversial subjective prior could now be quantified. De 
Finetti is particularly recognised as having put the use of subjective priors on a firm mathematical 
basis (37) (38) (39) (40). However, de Finetti’s work was not recognised for a long time in the 
predominantly English speaking Bayesian circles. 
Harold Jeffreys, a contemporary of Fisher, also made a major contribution to the development of 
Bayes’ theorem after Laplace. Jeffreys studied earthquakes and, using this theorem, was able to 
determine their epicentres based on the tsunamis that followed the earthquakes (41) 
 
2.4 Bayes’ applications during World War II 
Alan Mathison Turing is credited with the modern revival of Bayes’ theorem. Turing’s primary 
contribution was the decoding of German “Enigma” messages during World War II (42); especially 
that of the U boats. Turing quantified information in terms of a “ban” which  is similar to today’s byte 
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(used in information technology); Irving John Good, Turing’s statistical assistant,  wrote about 900 
articles on Bayes’ theorem, most of which were published. 
Another good friend of Turing’s, Claude Shannon (also a committed Bayesian) developed information 
theory (43), programmed a machine to play chess (44), performed cryptography analysis (45) and 
developed communications theory (46).  
Also during the Second World War, Andrei Kolmogorov used Bertrand’s tables to testing artillery for 
the Russian army. His theoretical work showed that probability can legitimately be used in both 
frequentist and Bayes’ theory (47) (48). Abraham Wald tested the quality of ammunitions which led 
him to develop sequential analysis, that is, the continuous analysis of data, as it arrives, whilst taking 
into account previous data (49). 
 
2.5 The Cold War Years 
At the height of the Cold War, search techniques were developed using Bayes’ theorem by Bernard 
Osgood Koopman (50), (51) (52). This helped in locating lost Hydrogen-bombs as well as submarines. 
Crews were rescued by the Coast Guards after their boats had capsized using Bayesian and Monte 
Carlo Methods (53). Monte Carlo methods use repeated sampling to determine the properties of a 
phenomenon. 
In civilian life, Bayes’ theorem had found many uses. The Essen-Moller index was a probability index 
based on Bayes’ theorem and used to determine paternity in lawsuits until DNA profiling became 
available. Mickey et al (54) showed that the index is quite reliable, provided a realistic prior is used. 
The Credibility Index, used by the insurance industry and developed by Whitney in 1918, was further 
updated by Arthur Bailey. Bailey discusses the fact that the insurance business uses Bayes’ theorem 
where prior knowledge is combined with current knowledge where the current knowledge is also 
weighted in order to make decisions in the face of uncertainty of future events (27). Bailey’s son, 
Robert used Bayes’ theorem to give drivers merit when they had no previous insurance claims (55) 
(56). 
Jimmie Savage’s book, “The Foundations of Statistics” in 1954 (57), gave further impetus to the 
revival of Bayes’ theorem and Savage himself led many statisticians on the road to accepting this 
theorem. 
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In medicine, Jerome Cornfield of the National Institute of Health (NIH) applied Bayes’ theorem to 
epidemiology (58) and showed a positive link between lung cancer and smoking (59). He also showed 
the link between cardiovascular disease and smoking, cholesterol, heart abnormalities and blood 
pressure (60). Homer Warner created the first computerised programme for detecting disease in 
1961. Basing it on 1,000 children with various congenital heart diseases, Warner showed that Bayes’ 
theorem could identify their underlying problems quite accurately (61). Warner had a total of 54 tests 
but this could be reduced to 7 or 8 tests to give the proper diagnosis (62). 
At the Harvard Business School, John Pratt, Howard Raiffa and Robert Schlaifer applied Bayes’ 
theorem to business decision making. Here the theorem flourished, because often decisions needed 
to be made fast on limited information (63).  
Allen Birnbaum introduced likelihood theory (64) derived from observed data only. This followed on 
from George Barnard’s work on statistical inference (65). 
One of the largest Bayesian projects undertaken before the advent of personal computers was the 
determination of authorship of the “Federalist papers” by Fred Mosteller and David Wallace (66). This 
project took more than ten years to complete with Wallace at times working full time, together with 
students and statistical assistants. Mosteller also found that Bayesian models proved to be more 
accurate than predictions based solely on prior probabilities. 
John Tukey used Bayes’ theorem to predict the Presidential election win for John F Kennedy in 1960; 
six hours before the official declaration. He, like Turing, had also worked on Enigma and decoding 
Soviet messages. Tukey also worked at Bell Labs where his work included the development of the 
cathode ray tube, development of anti-aircraft guided missiles and improving statistical sampling (67). 
Recommendations on improving statistical analysis became a priority after criticism of the statistical 
methods used in the Rasmussen Report on nuclear safety (68) and the Kinsey study on the sexual 
behaviour of the human male (69). 
Adrian Raftery discovered that with Bayesian analysis he could discover how abrupt changes can 
affect data. Raftery was analysing the change in fatalities in coal mining in the later 1880’s and early 
1890’s and discovered that the fall in fatalities was associated with the establishment of the Coal 
Worker’s Union, whose main concern was safety (70). 
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2.6 Bayes’ theorem comes of age 
The full force of the Bayesian revolution was felt in the 1980s. Considerably more powerful and easily 
accessible computers together with advances in sampling theory (71) (72) (73) (74) made Bayesian 
inference more applicable to a variety of different situations. Sampling allows Bayesian analysis to 
draw inferences even when data is missing or incomplete.  The development of the BUGS (Bayesian 
inference using Gibbs sampling) software by the Medical Research Council Biostatistics Unit, 
Cambridge in 1989 followed by  WinBUGS  developed together with Imperial College School of 
Medicine London (75)  allowed the fitting of complex statistical models using Markov chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) methods. Further development was also built on recently declassified information 
relating to the use of Bayes’ theorem during World War II. Such advances allowed Bayesian analysis 
to use increasingly larger datasets and ask increasingly complex questions. (76) (77) 
Thus, so far, Bayesian analysis has had many applications, ranging from analysing bird and animal 
distributions, mining, crop production, space programs, medical diagnosis and research (78) (79),  
engineering, decision analysis, artificial intelligence, email filtering, theoretical mathematical analysis 
(80) (81) (82) (83), child abuse (84) and prediction of the occurrence of epidemic meningitis (85)  
Bayesian analysis has also been used to differentiate the different levels of risk for disease treatment 
in medical negligence cases (86). This demonstrates the use of evidence based medicine and best 
practice in medico-legal cases and could be applied in the field of optometry. 
The search for missing Air France plane Flight 447 from Rio de Janerio to Paris in 2009 was conducted 
using Bayes’ theorem. An early assumption that the black box or the cockpit voice recorder would be 
emitting a signal led to delays. However, when the assumption was changed (that is the black box or 
the cockpit voice recorder was not emitting a signal), the search area was significantly reduced and 
the wreckage of the plane was found (87).  
 
2.7 The future of Bayes’ theorem …..  
So where does Bayes’ go from here? Every day data is being collected as part of routine tasks: 
institutions such banks, social media (Facebook and Twitter, for example), healthcare and sales. 
Incredible computer power today can use this data to make predictions based on Bayesian networks 
(88). Computers learn from accumulated data (the prior) to make predictions about the future. 
Predictions can be made in healthcare (89), risk analysis (insurance), marketing, crime and fraud, 
safety and efficiency, politics, government, education and human resources (90) (91). Such vast 
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quantities of data represent human experience on an unprecedented scale, which Bayes’ theorem 
can transform into powerful decision making tools.  
 
2.8 Previous applications of Bayes’ theorem in ophthalmic research 
Aspinall & Hill (92) described how Bayes’ theorem could be applied to making rational clinical 
decisions in optometry.  Since Aspinall & Hill’s work in 1983, applications in optometry and 
ophthalmology have included detection of ophthalmic disease from visual acuity and contrast 
sensitivity (93) and from colour vision (94) (95), the prediction of visual acuity following post- cataract 
surgery (96) (97),  the evaluation of visual field defects in patients with and without glaucoma (98) 
(99) (100) (101), prediction of retino-neural function following Nd-YAG laser in patients with posterior 
sub-capsular opacification (102) and prediction of childhood myopia (103). 
Most of the studies in eyecare, considered above, have been applications of naïve Bayesian analysis. 
Hand and Yu (104) have shown that naïve analysis works well in most cases and that the accuracy of 
naïve Bayesian analysis improves as the number of variables (tests) increases. Naïve Bayesian analysis 
supports heuristic solutions to disease diagnosis especially when more than one possible diagnosis is 
present (comorbidity) (105).  The advantage of naïve Bayesian analysis is its mathematical simplicity 
and for this reason it was applied in the present study. Naïve Bayesian analysis makes the following 
assumptions: 
 Each diagnosis is independent of any other diagnosis (e.g. dry eye is often associated with 
blepharitis; naïve Bayesian analysis would assume no relationship between the two)  
 Independence of tests outcomes (e.g.  a patient with corneal abrasion might present with two 
test outcomes - photophobia and cornea Fluorescein staining; Bayesian analysis would 
assume that these two test outcomes were independent of each other (106). 
  
2.9 Summary 
Relatively recent publications that have introduced the idea of applying Bayes’ theorem to help 
optometrists and ophthalmologist make clinical decisions (92), (101), (107), (108) often refer to 
frequentist statistical methods as traditional when, in actual fact, Bayesian statistical methods fell out 
of favour and have now returned. The use of Bayes’ theorem is now widespread. Though it has seen 
some application in ophthalmic research, the full potential of naïve Bayes’ theorem for use in day-to-
day primary care optometry has barely been touched upon. The next chapter demonstrates the 
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simplicity of naïve Bayesian calculations and introduces some of the factors that might influence its 
accuracy.  
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3. Naïve Bayesian analysis 
This chapter uses worked examples to demonstrate the simplicity of naïve Bayesian calculations and 
the influence on diagnostic accuracy of various factors later studied in this thesis.  
 
3.1 Decision Matrices 
With conventional probability notation, the probability of the presence of an eye condition/disease is 
stated as p(D+). Following a positive test result, the probability of an eye condition/ disease = 
p(D+|T+) and is expressed as:  
 p(D+|T+)=  p(T+|D+) x p(D+) 
   p(T+) 
 
That is, the probability of a positive diagnosis given a positive test result  is equal to the probability of 
a positive test result given a positive diagnosis multiplied by the probability of the presence of the 
diagnosis (that is, its prevalence) all divided by the probability of a positive test result.(101) 
 
The form of naïve Bayesian analysis carried out in this study essentially calculates the post-test 
probability of a number of eye conditions or diseases by modifying unequal objective priors (pre-test 
probability or prevalence) of those conditions or diseases using likelihood ratios (relating to a number 
of test outcomes).  
Sequential analysis refers to the use of more than one test outcome to calculate post-test 
probabilities for each eye condition or disease irrespective of the order of the tests. 
Throughout this thesis a simpler form of probability notation (ref) is applied to decision matrices in 
order to make the understanding of Bayes’ theorem more intuitive to the clinician, and demonstrate 
the ease with which Bayes’ theorem can be applied to routine clinical practice.  The number of 
decision matrices required is the product of the number of eye conditions or diseases and the 
number of test outcomes considered.  
Table 1 shows a 2x2 decision matrix (also known as a contingency table), that is used for Bayesian 
analyses (as described by Aspinall and Hill (92)).  In the definitions below, both the simpler and 
conventional probability notation is  given. 
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  Condition/Disease     
Test Present Absent  Row Total 
Positive a b a+b 
Negative c d c+d 
 Column Total  a+c b+d a+b+c+d 
Table 1 Decision Matrix (contingency table) (109), (107) 
Definitions of the elements of the decision matrix shown in Table 1 are as follows: 
 a+b+c+d  = the total sample size (i.e. the total number of cases seen)  
 a+c = the total number of cases  seen with the diagnosis  
 b+d = the total number of cases  seen without the diagnosis  
 a+b = the total number of cases testing positive  
 c+d = the total number of cases  testing negative 
 a= total number of cases with a positive diagnosis and positive test result (observed 
true positives)  
 b= total number of cases with a negative diagnosis and positive test result (observed 
false positives )  
 c= total number of cases with a positive diagnosis and negative test result (observed 
false negatives) 
 d= total number of cases with a negative diagnosis and negative test result (observed 
true negatives)  
From the above elements the following quantities can be calculated  
 Prevalence or pre-test probability = (a+c)/ (a+b+c+d) using simpler notation and  p(D+) using 
conventional notation.  
 Pre-test odds = prevalence / (1 - prevalence) using simpler notation and p(D+)/(1-p(D+)) 
using conventional notation. 
 Sensitivity = a / (a + c) using simpler notation and p(T+|D+) using conventional notation. This 
is the ratio of observed true positives to all those with a positive diagnosis.   
 Specificity = d / (b + d) using simpler notation and p(T-|D-) using conventional notation. This 
is the ratio of observed true negatives to all those with negative diagnosis.  
 Positive likelihood ratio (LR+) = sensitivity / (1 - specificity) using simpler notation and  
p(T+|D+)/ p(T+|D-) using conventional notation.  This ratio is used when a positive test result 
occurs.  
 Negative likelihood ratio (LR-) = (1 - sensitivity) / specificity using simpler notation and      
p(T-|D+)/p(T-|D-) using conventional notation. This ratio is used when a negative test result 
occurs. This is shown for completion only. Negative likelihood ratios were not used in the 
present study because only positive test findings were recorded (see 4.3 Data Collection).  
 Post-test odds = pre-test odds x LR (positive or negative likelihood ratio is used, depending on 
the test outcome) 
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 Post-test probability = post-test odds / (1 + post-test odds). This value is equal to the 
predictive values described by Hill and Aspinall (92), and Parikh et al (107),  which can be 
calculated more directly (that is,  without the use of likelihood ratios). However, the use of 
likelihood ratios has the advantage of enabling sequential analysis (3.7 Naïve Bayesian 
sequential analysis) and even diagnostic test selection (see 6.2 The use of positive likelihood 
ratios to select diagnostic tests) 
 Positive Predictive Value = a/a+b using simpler notation and p(D+|T+) using conventional 
notation. This is the ratio of true positives to all positive and is equal to the probability of a 
positive diagnosis when the test is positive. A high positive predictive value (that is close to 1) 
indicates a test that is as good as a “gold standard” test.  
 Negative Predictive Value = d/c+d using simpler notation and p(D-|T-) using conventional 
notation. This is the ratio of all the true negatives to all negatives and is equal to the 
probability of the absence of a diagnosis when the test is negative. Again, as with the positive 
predictive value, if the negative predictive value is close to 1 then the test is as good as a 
“gold standard” test. The probability of a positive diagnosis following a negative test result is 
= p(D+|T-) and is equal to 1-Negative predictive value. 
LR+ and LR- vary from 0 to infinite. Ratios of greater than 1 raise the post-test probability of a 
diagnosis. Ratios of less than 1 lower the post-test probability of a diagnosis. Ratios of 1 indicate that 
a test is not very useful for the diagnosis in question as post-test probability remains unaltered 
regardless of the test result (110), (111). 
Note how likelihood ratios are dependent on the sensitivity and specificity of the test under 
consideration. That is, they say something about the test but not the probability of disease in the 
patient who has just been tested.  Likelihood ratios have the advantage of portraying the amount by 
which a test result alters the probability of an eye condition or disease, not just whether a test is 
positive or negative (112). The fact that likelihood ratios are not influenced by prevalence (108), 
makes  them very useful as, for example, ratios derived from data collected in the secondary 
(hospital) eye care setting (in which the prevalence of eye disease is relatively high) can be applied in 
the primary eye care setting (in which the prevalence of eye disease is relatively low). 
The positive predictive value and negative predictive value are dependent on prevalence. Where 
prevalence is low, the number of false positives will be high and therefore the number of individuals 
with healthy eyes that are mistakenly diagnosed with the condition will be high, leading to 
unnecessary treatment. Thus predictive values are not constant over different clinical settings (being 
dependent on prevalence), unlike the likelihood ratio (being independent of prevalence) which can, 
therefore, be obtained from one clinical setting and used in another. (113),  (107).   
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3.2 Multiple levels of test outcomes 
Naïve Bayesian analysis assumes that all tests are independent of each other (see 2.8 Previous 
applications of Bayes’ theorem in ophthalmic research) 
Optometric clinical reality is not quite so simple. Certain measurements have multiple values, such as 
age, cup-to-disc ratios, and intraocular pressure measurements, and the clinician has to decide at 
which point a certain measurement assumes diagnostic importance. An incorrect decision would 
result in a missed diagnosis, or unnecessary referral. Therefore choosing the correct value is of 
immense diagnostic importance.  In this study, approved guidelines for “best practice” were used to 
determine test/ diagnostic levels of importance such as those from the National Institute for Health & 
Clinical Excellence (NICE) and College of Optometrists Clinical Management Guidelines (114), (115) as 
applied by the author in daily practice. 
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3 Worked examples of naïve Bayesian analysis  
Table 2 shows a worked example of how the information in a decision matrix is used to calculate the 
post-test probability a diagnosis being present. Here, the test is whether or not reduced vision is 
reported and the diagnosis is cataract. 
  Observed          
  
Reduced 
Vision (test) 
Cataract (diagnosis) 
Total 
  
  Present Absent   
  Positive 36 217 253   
  Negative 25 433 458   
  Total  61 650 711   
  Here:  
   
  
  
 
Prior probability = 0.0858 
 
  
  
 
Sensitivity = 0.5902 
 
  
  
 
Specificity = 0.6662 
 
  
  
 
LR+ = 1.7678 
 
  
  
 
LR- = 0.6152 
 
  
  If a test positive occurs ... 
  
  
  
 
Pre-test odds = 0.0938 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.1659 
 
  
  
 
Post-test 
probability = 0.1423 
 
  
  If a negative test occurs … 
  
  
  
 
Pre-test odds= 0.0938 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.0577 
 
  
  
 
Post-test 
probability= 0.0546 
 
  
            
Table 2 Worked example of naïve Bayesian analysis carried out on a test (reduced vision) in relation to a specific diagnosis 
(cataract). 
 
The pre-test probability, from the prevalence for this sample, is 9%.  A positive test result (that is, the 
reporting of reduced vision) increases the probability of cataract from 9% to 14%, whereas a negative 
test result (that is, the patient does not report a reduction in vision) reduces the probability of 
cataract from 9% to 5%. 
Although the present study did not use negative test findings and therefore the negative likelihood 
ratio, the usefulness of a negative test outcome is demonstrated here and in the following examples.  
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3.4 Factors affecting Bayesian Analysis   
Various factors potentially influence the accuracy of Bayesian analysis. These include prevalence 
(116), comorbidity and variation in presentation of symptoms and signs 
3.4.1 The effect of Prevalence  
Table 3and Table 4 show how likelihood ratios calculated for a specific test give rise to very different 
post-test probabilities in primary and secondary eye care settings in which the prevalence of eye 
disease is likely to be, respectively, relatively low and high. For example, the prevalence of glaucoma 
for a population seen in primary care is thought to be between 1- 4% (117) (118). In a secondary care 
setting, the prevalence may be much higher. Using the figures cited by Parikh et al (108), Table 3 
shows the post-test probability of glaucoma when a test (high intraocular pressure > 24 mmHg, 
sensitivity 50%, specificity 92% (119)) is used in the primary care setting in which the prevalence of 
glaucoma (prevalence 2.5%) is low. 
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  Diagnosis with low prevalence       
  Intraocular 
pressure > 
24 (test) 
Open Angle Glaucoma 
Total 
  
  Present Absent   
  Positive 125 780 905   
  Negative 125 8970 9095   
  Total  250 9750 10000   
  Here:  
   
  
  
 
Prior probability = 0.0250 
 
  
  
 
Sensitivity = 0.5000 
 
  
  
 
Specificity = 0.9200 
 
  
  
 
LR+ = 6.2500 
 
  
  
 
LR- = 0.5435 
 
  
  If a test positive occurs ... 
  
  
  
 
Pre-test odds = 0.0256 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.1603 
 
  
  
 
Post-test 
probability = 0.1381 
 
  
  If a negative test occurs … 
  
  
  
 
Pre-test odds= 0.0256 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.0139 
 
  
  
 
Post-test 
probability= 0.0137 
 
  
            
Table 3 Worked example of naïve Bayesian analysis carried out on a test (intraocular pressure > 24 mmHg) in relation to a 
specific diagnosis (glaucoma) in the primary care setting in which the prevalence of glaucoma is taken to be 2.5%. 
Table 4 shows the post-test probability of glaucoma that arises when the same test is used in 
secondary care, where perhaps the prevalence of glaucoma rises to 40%.  
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  Diagnosis with high prevalence       
  Intraocular 
pressure > 
24 (test) 
Open Angle Glaucoma 
Total 
  
  Present Absent   
  Positive 2000 480 2480   
  Negative 2000 5520 7520   
  Total  4000 6000 10000   
  Here:  
   
  
  
 
Prior probability = 0.4000 
 
  
  
 
Sensitivity = 0.5000 
 
  
  
 
Specificity = 0.9200 
 
  
  
 
LR+ = 6.2500 
 
  
  
 
LR- = 0.5435 
 
  
  If a test positive occurs ... 
  
  
  
 
Pre-test odds = 0.6667 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 4.1667 
 
  
  
 
Post-test 
probability = 0.8065 
 
  
  If a negative test occurs … 
  
  
  
 
Pre-test odds= 0.6667 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.3623 
 
  
  
 
Post-test 
probability= 0.2660 
 
  
            
Table 4 Worked example of naïve Bayesian analysis carried out on a test (intraocular pressure > 24 mmHg) in relation to a 
specific diagnosis (glaucoma) in a secondary care setting in which the prevalence of glaucoma is taken to be 40%. 
 
As the same test (intraocular pressure > 24 mmHg) was used in both the primary (Table 3) and 
secondary (Table 4) care settings, the same sensitivity (50%) and specificity (92%) were used in both 
sets of calculations. Given that positive and negative likelihood ratios are calculated using sensitivity 
and specificity, then it follows that that these values also remain the same (6.25 and 0.54, 
respectively) in both settings. However, the post-test probability for a positive test result differs 
dramatically in the primary (14%) and secondary (81%) care settings. So exactly the same test carried 
out in two different settings gives rise to very different levels of suspicion that glaucoma exists. It 
follows that with low prevalence a higher portion of positive test results will be false positives (113). 
The importance of the clinical setting has been recognised in previous studies (120). In qualitative 
terms, a positive test result in the primary care setting may only slightly raise the suspicion of eye 
disease, whereas a positive test in a secondary care setting may raise  suspicion significantly (121). It 
has thus been recognised that when prevalence is not taken into account in interpreting positive test 
results, unnecessary diagnostic errors can occur (122), (123), (124), (125). Accounting for prevalence 
is a key feature of Bayesian analysis that sets it apart from other forms of statistical analysis (e.g. t-
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tests, analyses of variance, that are all frequentist in nature ( see 2.3 The Early 20th Century) that are 
more  used in clinical research (92).  
 
3.4.2 The effect of Comorbidity  
Comorbidity refers to the coexistence of eye conditions or diseases in the same individual (126). This 
could confound the linkage between test findings and specific diagnoses.  This factor was considered 
by a research group that applied Bayesian analysis to the diagnosis of dementia (127), (128). Their 
findings indicated that Bayesian analysis could be successfully performed even in the presence of 
comorbidity.  Table 5 and Table 6 illustrate confounding arising from comorbidity together with the 
additional influence of prevalence and suggest that Chi-square filtering is a possible remedy.  
Table 5 reveals, as might be expected, that uncorrected ametropia has a high prevalence (81%) in the 
primary care setting. One would expect this condition to be associated with reported reduced vision 
and, taken as a test for uncorrected ametropia; this symptom has a sensitivity of 40% and a specificity 
of 82% with corresponding positive and negative likelihood ratios of 2.20 and 0.74, respectively.  
Now consider pinguecula (Table 6). This would not normally be associated with reported reduced 
vision. However, given the high prevalence of uncorrected ametropia, it is to be expected that some 
individuals with uncorrected ametropia will also have pinguecula. Pinguecula is also relatively 
uncommon (prevalence = 2%). So a rather high proportion of cases with pinguecula might also have 
uncorrected ametropia and reported reduced vision. Consequently, the decision matrix shown in 
Table 6 shows that reported reduced vision, as a test for pinguecula, has an unexpectedly high 
sensitivity (56%) and specificity (65%) with positive and negative likelihood ratios (1.63 and 0.66, 
respectively) of approximately the same magnitude as found for uncorrected ametropia. 
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  Observed  
   
  
  
Reduced 
Vision (test) 
uncorrected Ametropia (diagnosis) 
Total 
  
  Present Absent   
  Positive 228 25 253   
  Negative 345 113 458   
  Total  573 138 711   
  Here:  
   
  
  
 
Prior probability = 0.8059 
 
  
  
 
Sensitivity = 0.3979 
 
  
  
 
Specificity = 0.8188 
 
  
  
 
LR+ = 2.1964 
 
  
  
 
LR- = 0.7353 
 
  
  If a test positive occurs ... 
  
  
  
 
Pre-test odds = 4.1522 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 9.1200 
 
  
  
 
Post-test probability = 0.9012 
 
  
  If a negative test occurs … 
 
  
  
 
Pre-test odds= 4.1522 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 3.0531 
 
  
  
 
Post-test probability= 0.7533 
 
  
  
    
  
  
 
Chi-square with Yates'
correction = 21.86  
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
df = 1 
 
  
  
 
p-value =  <0.001 
 
  
            
Table 5  Worked example of naïve Bayesian analysis carried out on a test (reported reduced vision) in relation to a specific 
diagnosis (uncorrected ametropia). Chi-square with Yates’ correction has been applied to the diagnostic matrix and 
reveals a strong association (p-value < 0.001) between the test and the diagnosis being considered.  
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  Observed  
   
  
  
Reduced 
Vision (test) 
Pinguecula 
Total 
  
  Present Absent   
  Positive 8 245 253   
  Negative 6 452 458   
  Total  14 697 711   
  Here:  
   
  
  
 
Prior probability = 0.0197 
 
  
  
 
Sensitivity = 0.5714 
 
  
  
 
Specificity = 0.6485 
 
  
  
 
LR+ = 1.6257 
 
  
  
 
LR- = 0.6609 
 
  
  If a test positive occurs ... 
 
  
  
 
Pre-test odds = 0.0201 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.0327 
 
  
  
 
Post-test probability = 0.0316 
 
  
  If a negative test occurs … 
 
  
  
 
Pre-test odds= 0.0201 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.0133 
 
  
  
 
Post-test probability= 0.0131 
 
  
  
    
  
  
 
Chi-square with Yates'
correction = 2.02 
 
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
df= 1 
 
  
  
 
p-value= >0.05 
 
  
            
Table 6  Worked example of naïve Bayesian analysis carried out on a test (reported reduced vision) in relation to a specific 
diagnosis (pinguecula). Chi-square with Yates’ correction has been applied to the diagnostic matrix and reveals a weak 
association (p-value >0.05) between the test and the diagnosis being considered.  
 
It is proposed that using a Chi-square filter might be a remedy. Here, Chi-square is used to indicate 
the strength of the association between any test and diagnosis. Weakly associated test-diagnosis 
combinations could be disregarded.  Calculating Chi-square involves determining expected counts in 
each cell of the corresponding decision matrix and, in instances where expected counts drop below 
10, Yates’ correction is advised (129). For computational simplicity Yates’ correction could be carried 
out on all diagnostic matrices. Table 5 shows that the association between reported reduced vision 
and uncorrected ametropia is strong (Chi-square with Yates’ correction = 21.9, df = 1, p-value <0.001). 
Table 6 on the other hand, shows that the association between reported reduced vision and 
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pinguecula is weak (Chi-square with Yates’ correction = 2.0, df = 1, p-value > 0.05). Note how Chi-
square alters a great deal in both instances despite the likelihood ratios being very similar. 
The proposed use of Chi-square to filter out weakly associated test-diagnosis combinations may be 
unnecessary. Table 5 shows that, because uncorrected ametropia is common (that is, its prevalence is 
high), a positive test outcome (i.e. reduced vision is reported) gives rise to a post-test probability of 
90%. Table 6, however, shows that, because pinguecula is relatively rare (that is, its prevalence is 
low), a positive test outcome gives rise to a post-test probability of only 3%. So spurious associations 
between tests and diagnoses that arise due to comorbidity may have only a very small impact on 
accuracy. Nevertheless, Gill et al.  (130) pointed out that small elevations of post-test probability can 
accumulate when large numbers of tests are used. As the question of whether or not to use Chi-
square filtering remains equivocal, the effect on accuracy of using such a filter was tested in the 
present study. 
 
3.4.3 The Effect of Presentation Variation  
It is likely that variations in presentation of various eye conditions and diseases will alter accuracy in a 
similar manner to that described above for comorbidity. For example, not all people with uncorrected 
ametropia will report reduced vision. This was also tested in the present study.   
 
3.5 Circularity  
Circularity, that is, the testing of the Bayesian analysis using the same data that was used determine 
the prevalence and build the likelihood ratios in the first place could, theoretically, overestimate the 
performance of the analysis. Therefore, this also was tested in the present study.   
 
3.6 Use of the Laplacian Correction 
Problems arise if any cell in a diagnostic matrix contains zero counts. This could result in likelihood 
ratios of zero and, in turn, post-test probabilities of zero would occur at any point in during naïve 
Bayesian sequential analysis (see section 3.1). A post-test probability of zero would absolutely rule 
out a diagnosis even if subsequent tests strongly indicated that the diagnosis was actually present. A 
remedy for this is to add a very small increment to cell counts a-d in each decision matrix Table 8. This 
is called a Laplacian correction (131). Commonly “1” is added to each cell and is known as “add 1 
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smoothing”.  However to ensure that the increment added to the cells made the least difference to 
the original cell counts, an addition of 0.001 to the count in each cell was considered to be sufficient, 
and thus ensured that no diagnosis can be entirely ruled out (after all, it is not possible to be 100% 
certain of the presence or absence of any diagnosis). The probability of such a diagnosis being present 
just becomes very small instead. Table 7 and Table 8 show a worked example demonstrating the 
effect of the Laplacian correction adopted in the present study. Table 9  shows the effect of using the 
commonly used “add 1 smoothing” and as can be seen by comparing Table 8 and  Table 9, the larger 
the increment added to each cell, the greater the effect on the calculated prevalence and the post-
test probability. 
Although there are many different methods of smoothing and eliminating the effects of a zero count 
in any of the cells, the investigation of these was considered to be beyond the scope of this study.  
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  Hypothetical        
  Reduced 
Vision 
(test) 
Cataract (diagnosis) 
Total 
  
  Present Absent   
  Positive 61 531 592   
  Negative 0 119 119   
  Total 61 650 711   
  Here:  
   
  
  
 
Prior probability = 0.0857947 
 
  
  
 
Sensitivity = 1.0000000 
 
  
  
 
Specificity = 0.1830769 
 
  
  
 
LR+ = 1.2241055 
 
  
  
 
LR- = 0.0000000 
 
  
  If a test positive occurs ... 
  
  
  
 
Pre-test odds = 0.0938462 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.1148776 
 
  
  
 
Post-test 
probability = 0.1030405 
 
  
  If a negative test occurs … 
  
  
  
 
Pre-test odds= 0.0938462 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.0000000 
 
  
  
 
Post-test 
probability= 0.0000000 
 
  
            
Table 7 Worked example of the calculation of prevalence, likelihood ratios and post-test probability before the 
application of the Laplacian correction. Here, if a negative test occurs the negative likelihood ratio would be applied and 
this effectively reduces the post-test probability to zero. In a sequential analysis, this would rule out any further 
diagnosis, even if the likelihood ratio applied later was of a very high magnitude.  
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  Hypothetical With Laplacian Correction    
  Reduced 
Vision 
(test) 
Cataract (diagnosis) 
Total 
  
  Present Absent   
  Positive 61.001 531.001 592.002   
  Negative 0.001 119.001 119.002   
  Total 61.002 650.002 711.004   
  Here:  
   
  
  
 
Prior probability = 0.0857970 
 
  
  
 
Sensitivity = 0.9999836 
 
  
  
 
Specificity = 0.1830779 
 
  
  
 
LR+ = 1.2240869 
 
  
  
 
LR- = 0.0000895 
 
  
  If a test positive occurs ... 
  
  
  
 
Pre-test odds = 0.0938489 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.1148793 
 
  
  
 
Post-test probability 
= 0.1030419 
 
  
  If a negative test occurs … 
  
  
  
 
Pre-test odds= 0.0938489 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.0000084 
 
  
  
 
Post-test probability= 0.0000084 
 
  
            
Table 8  Worked example of the calculation of prevalence, likelihood ratios and post-test probability after the application 
of the Laplacian correction. Note how addition of a correction of 0.001 to each cell of a diagnostic matrix makes little 
difference to calculations apart from removing the possibility of post-test probabilities of zero. 
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  Hypothetical With Laplace smoothng Correction "add 1"   
  
Reduced 
Vision (test) 
Cataract (diagnosis) 
Total 
  
  Present Absent   
  Positive 62 532 594   
  Negative 1 120 121   
  Total 63 652 715   
  Here:  
   
  
  
 
Prior probability = 0.0881119 
 
  
  
 
Sensitivity = 0.9841270 
 
  
  
 
Specificity = 0.1840491 
 
  
  
 
LR+ = 1.2061105 
 
  
  
 
LR- = 0.0862434 
 
  
  If a test positive occurs ... 
 
  
  
 
Pre-test odds = 0.0966258 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.1165414 
 
  
  
 
Post-test 
probability = 0.1043771 
 
  
  If a negative test occurs … 
 
  
  
 
Pre-test odds= 0.0966258 
 
  
  
 
Post-test odds = 0.0083333 
 
  
  
 
Post-test 
probability= 0.0082645 
 
  
            
Table 9  Worked example of the calculation of prevalence, likelihood ratios and post-test probability after the application 
of the Laplace smoothing add 1 correction. Note how addition of a correction of 1 to each cell of a diagnostic matrix 
makes a greater difference to the prevalence, and the post-test probability of the diagnosis being present following a 
negative test result compared to the  example in Table 8. 
 
3.7 Naïve Bayesian sequential analysis  
Primary eye care does not involve carrying out one isolated test to indicate the presence of just one 
diagnosis. In fact, a battery of screening tests is carried out, often leading to more than one tentative 
diagnosis.  
To apply Bayesian analysis to such a situation, the post-test odds of the first test becomes the pre-
test odds for the second. In turn, the post-test odds of the second test become the pre-test odds for 
the third and so on (130). In this sequential manner both positive and negative likelihood ratios may 
be used to raise or lower the final probabilities of each possible diagnosis depending on the outcome 
of each test (though in the present study, only positive likelihood ratios were used, see 4.3 Data 
Collection).  Wald and Wolfowitz (49)  had used the term “sequential analyses” as long ago as 1950. 
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For the purposes of this study, naïve Bayesian sequential analysis refers to a continuous analysis of 
data; essentially analysing new data as it arrives whilst taking into account previous data, where the 
order of new data being applied to the analysis is not relevant. 
For example, the diagnosis of primary open angle glaucoma (POAG) is usually made after several tests 
which inform the decision making process. In the following example, 3 tests (intraocular pressure 
[IOP] >= 24mmHg; cup to disc ratio [CDR] >= 0.7; If ISNT rule is true or false) are used to change the 
post-test probability of a positive diagnosis of POAG. Table 10 shows the three tests being used and 
their sensitivity, specificity and associated likelihood ratios.  
 
  Sensitivity Specificity LR+ LR- 
IOP >=24mmHg 50 92 6.2500 0.5435 
ISNT 72 79 3.4286 0.3544 
CDR >= 0.7 20 99 20.0000 0.8081 
Table 10  Three tests used to inform decision making about POAG with their sensitivity, specificity and associated 
likelihood ratios 
Taking the prevalence of POAG to be 2%, the pre-test odds are calculated. With a positive test result, 
the pre-test odds are multiplied by the LR+ to give the post-test odds. This, in turn becomes the pre-
test odds for the next test. So,  
Post-test oddsIOP= pre-test odds x LR+ IOP 
Post-test oddsISNT & IOP = post-test odds IOP  x LR+ISNT = pre-test odds x LR+ IOP x LR+ISNT 
Post-test odds CDR& ISNT & IOP = Post-test odds ISNT & IOP  x  LR+CDR = pre-test odds x LR+ IOP x LR+ISNT x LR+CDR 
 
Thus ,  for n number of tests  
 Post-test oddsn = Pre-test odds x LR+1 x LR+2 x LR+3 ………..LR+n 
And from this is can be seen that the order of the tests is not critical to the analysis. 
Using the three tests (that is IOP, ISNT rule and CDR measurement) the post-test probabilities can be 
calculated at each stage. 
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Figure 3  shows more than one test is used to give a final post-test probability. Here IOP, CDR measurement and presence 
or absence of ISNT rule determines the final probability of a positive diagnosis of POAG. 
 
 
Pre-test probability of POAG = 0.02 
Calculate pre-test odds  
Test – IOP 
Positive result – multiply pre- test by 
LR+ to obtain post –test odds 
 
Post-test odds for IOP test now 
becomes pre-test odds for CDR test. 
Positive test result -multiple by LR+ to 
obtain new post-test odds 
Post-test odds for CDR test now 
become the pre-test odds for ISNT 
test. Positive test result -multiple by 
LR+ to obtain new post-test odds 
All tests now complete 
Convert post-test odds for ISNT test 
to post-test probability for positive 
diagnosis of primary open angle 
glaucoma  
45 
  
  P
re
-t
es
t 
P
re
va
le
n
ce
 
IO
P
 
C
D
R
 
IS
N
T 
 
No test 0.0200 0.0200 0.0200 0.0200 
IOP only  0.0200 0.1131 0.1131 0.1131 
IOP and CDR 0.0200 0.1131 0.7184 0.7184 
IOP, CDR &ISNT 0.0200 0.1131 0.7184 0.8974 
Table 11 Prevalence of primary open angle glaucoma is set at 2%. Note how the post-test probability of a positive 
diagnosis of primary open angle glaucoma increases with each successive positive test result. 
 
To take this example further, consider the following four ocular surface conditions, dry eye, allergic 
conjunctivitis, bacterial conjunctivitis and viral conjunctivitis. Using 4 symptoms as reported by the 
patient and 3 signs as noted by the optometrist, Bayesian analysis can give the possible differential 
diagnosis between the four ocular conditions. Test outcomes are represented by 1=positive test 
result, 0= negative test result, blank = test not carried out. 
Table 12, Table 13, and Table 14, show how a test or a combination of tests can improve the 
differential diagnosis achieved.  Table 14 also shows the advantage of recording a negative sign in 
improving the diagnosis.  
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      presenting symptoms signs    
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(%
) 
which test? >>         selection no no YES   
test outcome? >>   1               
dry 0.1525 0.3726 0.3726 0.3726 0.3726 0.3726 0.3726 0.3726 37.26 
allergic 0.0654 0.4949 0.4949 0.4949 0.4949 0.4949 0.4949 0.4949 49.49 
bacterial 0.0196 0.0291 0.0291 0.0291 0.0291 0.0291 0.0291 0.0291 2.91 
viral 0.0040 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068 0.68 
Table 12 Pre-test probabilities for the four conditions are shown on the left. The probabilities are changed with the 
application of a positive test result for itchy eye.  Two conditions, ocular allergy and dry eye have significantly raised post-
test probabilities.  
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n
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(%
) 
which test? >>         selection no no YES   
test outcome? >>   1           1   
dry 0.1525 0.3726 0.3726 0.3726 0.3726 0.3726 0.3726 0.5024 50.24 
allergic 0.0654 0.4949 0.4949 0.4949 0.4949 0.4949 0.4949 0.9920 99.20 
bacterial 0.0196 0.0291 0.0291 0.0291 0.0291 0.0291 0.0291 0.0206 2.06 
viral 0.0040 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068 0.0000 0.00 
Table 13 Carrying out a second test, the presence of palpebral papillae, the post-test probabilities change again and now 
a diagnosis of allergy becomes significantly more likely than a diagnosis of dry eye. Note how, with a positive test result 
for palpebral papillae, the post-test probability for a viral eye condition actually is reduced. 
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) 
which test? >>         selection Yes no no   
test outcome? >>   1 1     1   0   
dry 0.1525 0.3726 0.8330 0.8330 0.8330 0.9920 0.9920 0.9920 99.20 
allergic 0.0654 0.4949 0.8045 0.8045 0.8045 0.8045 0.8045 0.2916 29.16 
bacterial 0.0196 0.0291 0.0431 0.0431 0.0431 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 
viral 0.0040 0.0068 0.0219 0.0219 0.0219 0.0511 0.0511 0.0511 5.11 
Table 14 In this example, there are two presenting symptoms, itchy eye that has a high association with ocular allergy and 
burning which is highly associated with dry eye. To distinguish between the two conditions, two signs are looked for and 
a positive result for fluorescein staining and a negative result for palpebral papillae make dry eye the more likely of the 
two conditions. Note, that prior to determining the presence of palpebral papillae, but after noting the presence of 
fluorescein staining, the probability for dry eye is 99% and ocular allergy is 80%;  after determining the absence of 
palpebral papillae the probability of dry eye remains unchanged, but the probability of ocular allergy is reduced to 29%. 
This demonstrates the importance of recording negative findings during the eye examination.  
 
In this manner, a list of alternative diagnoses can be obtained and, by ranking them in order of 
ascending probability, the most likely diagnoses can be identified. Thus, Bayesian analysis has the 
potential to assist in increasing the accuracy of eye examinations carried out by community 
optometrists.     
 
3.8 Summary 
Recall, from chapter 2, that one of the historical objections to earlier Bayesian analyses related to the 
use of equal and subjective priors. Less objectionable unequal objective priors are used in this thesis. 
These come in the form of the prevalence of eye conditions or diseases. Prevalence is converted to 
pre-test odds that are altered using likelihood ratios generated for each test outcome (representing 
new evidence) to give post-test odds and, ultimately, probability. Likelihood ratios have a number of 
advantages and one of them is to enable sequential analysis of many test outcomes, including those 
with multiple levels. Naïve Bayesian sequential analyses tested in this thesis include Laplacian 
correction. In addition, Chi-square filtering is explored, for the first time, as a means of overcoming 
some of the factors (prevalence, comorbidity and presentation variation) that might influence the 
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accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis. Circularity is another factor that is explored for the 
first time. The next chapter provides a description of the methodological aspects of this study.      
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4. Methodology 
This chapter covers the methodological aspects of this study. 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The purpose of the present study was to explore factors influencing the accuracy of naïve Bayesian 
sequential analysis when applied to clinical data collected in the primary eye care setting. As such, it 
is important for the reader to understand that neither the provision of eye care  nor the range of eye 
diseases encountered in this part of Tanzania were the primary focus of the study.  
The study was retrospective, i.e. it posed a question and looked back at data to find the answers, as 
opposed to a prospective study, which would pose a question and then design a study to find the 
answers. (132) 
Confidential clinical data (such as patient age, sex, ethnicity, symptoms, signs and diagnoses) are 
being collected in primary care practices all over the world every day. This wealth of data is very 
rarely used for epidemiological studies, and yet can inform public health policies as well as informing 
clinical decision-making by individual eye care practitioners.  
 
4.2 Ethical Approval  
The clinical data needed to be collected without prior consent as any refusal to participate in this 
study would corrupt estimates of prevalence (i.e. pre-test probability) that are essential for Bayesian 
analysis. Attempts to gain consent early on in the study raised subtle issues of trust. For example, 
patients may wonder why an optometrist would need to carry out such research. Might it be that 
optometrists doubt their ability to make clinical decisions without the assistance of computers? If that 
is the case, then are optometrists to be trusted? Fortunately, there is precedent for unconsented 
retrospective analysis of fully anonymised clinical data (effectively a clinical audit (133)). This case was 
made to the research ethics committees of Aston University and Tanzania’s National Institute of 
Medical Research (NIMR) and ethical approval for the study was granted. A research certificate was 
also obtained from the Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) in Tanzania. Clearances 
from both NIMR and COSTECH ensured that the project was undertaken in accordance with 
Tanzanian laws and protocols (see pages 111 & 113) 
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4.3 Data Collection   
The clinical data for this analysis was collected from 
Eyeline Optometrists (see Figure 4), a family owned 
community practice, in Dar es Salaam city centre. 
The data constituted clinical records of routine eye 
examinations (134) (135).  
The patient base at Eyeline Optometrists is varied, 
but not typical of Tanzania. This is partly due to the 
location of the practice. The language used in the 
practice varies almost equally between English, 
Kiswahili (the local African language) and Gujarati 
(spoken by most Indians). Hindi and French 
speaking patients are occasionally seen.  
The time period chosen for data collection was one 
year, from October 2010 to October 2011. Initially, 
data was recorded as necessary for the purposes of 
primary care practice. Practice data needs to inform 
the practitioner’s decisions, whether at that 
particular examination or at an examination sometime in the future (136). Here, positive and negative 
test findings have to be recorded as part of the practitioner’s legal defence in case of a complaint. For 
the purposes of this study, cases that presented for follow-up visits, where diagnoses had been 
previously made, were excluded from the analysis.  
Prior to any analysis, all cases were anonymised by the removal of any personal details that could 
lead to identification of a particular patient. Of the 1524 cases seen during the designated time 
period, 1422 met the criteria for analysis. In these 1422 cases, 199 test outcomes were found to be 
associated with 57 diagnoses. Preliminary examination of this data revealed that further refinement 
was necessary in the interests of consistency (for example, where several reported visual complaints 
actually represented the same symptom or where the exact nature of a symptom, for example its 
laterality or onset, were not recorded because they did not aid diagnosis at the time of the eye 
examination). This refinement process was extremely time consuming and leads to the 
recommendation for future research of this type that data collection should be prospective and 
should use standardised test outcomes and diagnoses.  
Figure 4 Staff of Eyeline Optometrists, Dar es 
Salaam 
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Only positive test outcome were included in the analysis, as the data contained positive outcomes 
only of tests carried out. While positive test outcome had an unambiguous meaning, the absence of a 
positive sign was open to the following interpretation: 
 Either the test was carried out and was negative  
 Or the test was not carried out at all. 
Because of this ambiguity, it was not considered valid to assume that the absence of a positive test 
sign could be interpreted as a negative test result and thus prevented the use of negative likelihood 
ratios in the naïve Bayesian sequential analysis. The consequence of this decision was that a modified 
form of naïve Bayesian analysis was performed that only included positive likelihood ratios.  
 
4.4 Methods  
4.4.1 Splitting the database  
The refined data was split into two equal datasets of 711 cases each (datasets A and B). These 
represented the first 711 cases seen (dataset A) and then the second 711 cases seen (dataset B). 
Creation of the two datasets allowed the accuracy of Bayesian analysis to be tested with and without 
circularity.  
Each dataset was checked against the other to ensure that the same diagnoses and tests occurred in 
both datasets. This left the two datasets with 105 test items and 35 diagnoses.  Bayesian analysis on 
this data required the construction of 3,675 decision matrices (that is, 105 tests x 35 diagnoses). 
4.4.1.1 Preliminary analysis 
A preliminary investigation was carried out on 10 diagnoses and 15 test items. This reduced the 
analysis to 150 decision matrices (that is, 15 tests x 10 diagnoses), and enabled an initial assessment 
of the effects on accuracy of circularity, prevalence, comorbidity, presentation variation and Chi-
square filtering..  
 
4.4.1.2 Main analysis 
The process was then repeated with the full dataset, involving 105 test items and 35 diagnoses and 
the construction and analysis of 3.675 decision matrices.  
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4.4.2 Comorbidity  
The comorbidity for each case was based on the original complete data (that which included all 57 
original diagnoses) as some of the test outcomes could have resulted from diagnoses that were 
eventually not included but might, nevertheless, have influenced the accuracy of diagnoses arising 
from Bayesian analysis.   
 
4.4.3 Prevalence 
Prevalence was calculated as described in section 3.1. If comorbidity was present, then the median 
prevalence was calculated from all diagnoses made for that case.  
 
4.4.4 Presentation variation 
Datasets A and B showed test outcomes as they naturally occurred (observed data). That is, it was not 
always the case that “textbook” relationships between diagnoses and test outcomes arose. The 
impact on the accuracy of Bayesian analysis of natural variations in test outcomes associated with 
each diagnosis was investigated by creating two further datasets with all presentation variation 
removed.  In the preliminary study and the main study, this was carried out in two very different 
ways. The presentation variation was the number of mismatches found between the observed 
dataset and the “textbook” dataset. 
4.4.4.1 Presentation Variation in Preliminary Analysis 
The calculation of presentation variation required reconstruction of new datasets (A and B) for which 
all presentation variation was removed. For the preliminary analysis, this was a relatively simple 
process as only 15 test outcomes were matched to 10 diagnoses; the 15 test outcomes were selected 
(5.1 Selection of tests and diagnoses) partly because of their unambiguous linkage to each diagnosis. 
The required presentation variation was then equal to the number of mismatches found, case by 
case, when comparing the test outcomes for the observed and “textbook” data in both datasets  
4.4.4.2 Presentation Variation in Main Analysis 
The main study consisted of 3,675 decision matrices representing 105 test outcome and 35 diagnosis 
combinations. It was not feasible to search the literature for “textbook” associations for all these 
combination. The supervisor of this project had also previously carried out literature searches of this 
sort, as part of a series of dissertations completed by final year optometry students, which indicated 
that the required information was lacking. 
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The lengthy process of removing presentation variation from 105 test outcomes in relation to 35 
diagnoses had to be carried out in two stages. The first stage involved re-combining both datasets (A 
and B) and calculating Chi-square filtered positive likelihood ratios for all 3675 test 
outcome/diagnosis combinations. The second stage involved selection of “textbook” test outcomes 
for each diagnosis by including only those for which the Chi-square filtered positive likelihood ratio 
was greater than 1 (a value of 1 indicated a test of no diagnostic value) and, in the professional 
opinion of the author, “made sense”. By this means, the 35 diagnoses were typically assigned 2 
definitive test outcomes but up to 9 “textbook” test outcomes were noted. Finally a “textbook” 
dataset B (that for which Bayesian analysis was applied), with presentation variation removed, was 
constructed by taking the observed diagnoses for each case and replacing the observed test 
outcomes for each diagnosis with “textbook” test outcomes. . The required presentation variation 
was then equal to the number of mismatches found, case by case, when comparing the test 
outcomes for the observed and “textbook” B datasets. 
 
4.4.5  Decision matrices with Laplacian correction   
Decision matrices incorporating Laplacian correction were constructed (as shown in section 3.6 Use of 
the Laplacian Correction) for each test outcome and diagnosis combination. As mentioned earlier, this 
involved calculation of 150 matrices for the preliminary analysis and 3,675 matrices for the main 
analysis (see 4.4.1 Splitting the database). These matrices were used to calculate prevalence and 
positive likelihood ratios (as shown in section 3.1 Decision Matrices) 
 
4.4.6  Chi-Square filtering of likelihood ratios 
Chi-square with Yates’ correction was used to filter out positive likelihood ratios that represented 
weakly associated test outcome/diagnosis combinations. Chi-square values were calculated as shown 
in 3.4.2 The effect of Comorbidity. A critical minimum Chi-square then had to be determined, below 
which Likelihood ratios would be filtered out. The minimum Chi-square value was determined using a 
Probability Distribution Calculator (127) 
 
4.4.6.1 Chi-square filtering in the preliminary study 
For the preliminary study, 150 decision matrices were constructed (4.4.1.1 Preliminary analysis) In 
order to avoid even 1 statistical false positive error (that is, to have a probability of a statistical false 
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positive error of less than 1 in 150 = 0.006667). The Probability Distribution Calculator indicated that 
the minimum Chi-square value required was 7.36. 
4.4.6.2 Chi-square filtering in the main study 
Similarly, for the main analysis, 3,675 decision matrices were constructed (see section  
4.4.1.2 Main analysis). To avoid a statistical false positive error (i.e. to have a probability of a false 
positive error of less than 1 in 3,675 = 0.000272) the Probability Distribution calculator indicated the 
minimum Chi- square value required was 13.25.  
 
4.4.7 Naïve Bayesian sequential analysis 
This was performed case by case. All test outcomes were entered into the analysis. The pre-test odds 
for all diagnosis were multiplied by the Chi-square filtered positive likelihood ratios of each positive 
test outcome. The final post-test odds for all diagnoses were then converted to post-test 
probabilities. Diagnoses were then ranked in order or descending post-test probability. 
4.4.7.1 Naïve Bayesian sequential analysis in the preliminary study 
As described in 4.4.7 Naïve Bayesian sequential analysis, positive likelihood ratios were used to 
convert pre-test probability into post-test probability (Figure 5). 
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Pre-test probability 
of each eye 
Pre-test odds of each 
eye condition 
Carry out new test 
(demographic, symptom, 
history, or sign) 
Positive test 
result  
Multiple pre-test odds by 
LR+ 
Post-test odds of each 
eye condition  
All tests completed? 
No  Yes  
Differential diagnosis – ranking each eye 
condition in order of post-test probability 
Previous post-test 
odds becomes new 
pre-test odds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure 5  Flow chart showing the process of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis using only LR+. In the 
main study, the analysis was extended to include tests recommended by the use of LR+. 
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4.4.7.2 Naïve Bayesian analysis in the main study  
As described in 4.4.7 Naïve Bayesian sequential analysis, pre-test probabilities were converted to 
post-test probabilities using the likelihood ratios. However an extension of the use of likelihood ratios 
was incorporated to recommend supplementary tests to confirm diagnoses. 
 
4.4.8 Accuracy  
Accuracy was expressed as the percentage of cases for which the diagnoses made by the clinician 
appeared at the top of a ranked list generated by naïve Bayesian sequential analysis.  
 
4.4.9 Circularity  
In the preliminary analysis, percentage accuracy was compared with and without circularity. 
Circularity was present if accuracy was investigated by using the pre-test odds and likelihood ratios 
generated from dataset A to make diagnoses on the test outcomes of dataset A. On the other hand, 
circularity was absent if the accuracy was investigated by using the pre-test odds and likelihood ratios 
generated from dataset A to make diagnoses on the test outcomes of dataset B. The main analysis 
was carried out in the absence of circularity.  
 
4.4.10 Use of Microsoft® Excel® spreadsheets` 
Microsoft® Excel® spreadsheets were used to perform all the calculations necessary for all decision 
matrices (See example given in Table 15 Tables ). The data used in all the calculations to determine 
prevalence and the likelihood ratios were taken from dataset A.   
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Table 15 Tables 15.1 to 15.21  serve to illustrate how Microsoft® Excel® spread sheets were used to calculate filtered 
likelihood ratios. Note that the example shown only considers 4 diagnoses and 7 tests extracted from the main study data 
(chapter 6). The 4 diagnoses shown are all causes of conjunctivitis (dry eye, allergic, bacterial and viral). The 7 tests shown 
include 4 symptoms reported by patients (itchy eye, burning eye, watery discharge and sticky discharge) and 3 signs 
(fluorescein staining, palpebral redness, palpebral papillae). All tables make reference to cells a, b, c and d of the decision 
matrix described in Table 1. Tables 15.1 to 15.8 create the decision matrices for each test/diagnosis combination. Tables 
15.9 to 15.17 lead to the calculation of Chi-square for cells a, b, c and d. Tables 15.18 to 15.20 show the calculation of 
positive likelihood ratios from sensitivity and specificity. Table 15.21 show filtered likelihood ratios. The critical value of 
13.25 shown in Table 15.21 was that used in the main study (see section 4.4.6.2). The prevalence of each diagnosis was 
calculated by dividing the number of cases seen with the diagnosis (Table 15.2) by the total number of cases seen (Table 
15.1).  
 
Table 15.1 The total number of cases seen. This gives cell (a+b+c+d) in each diagnostic matrix. The Laplacian correction of 
0.001  is added (a value of 0.004 appears as the total number of cases seen represents 4 cells in each diagnostic matrix). 
(a+b+c+d)  symptoms       signs      
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dry 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 
allergic 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 
bacterial 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 
viral 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 711.004 
 
Table 15.2 shows the total number of cases seen with the diagnosis. This represents the (a+c) cell of the decision matrix in 
Table 1. The Laplacian correction appears as 0.002 as the total number of cases with the diagnosis represents 2 cells of 
the diagnostic matrix. 
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dry 110.002 110.002 110.002 110.002 110.002 110.002 110.002 
allergic 44.002 44.002 44.002 44.002 44.002 44.002 44.002 
bacterial 11.002 11.002 11.002 11.002 11.002 11.002 11.002 
viral 3.002 3.002 3.002 3.002 3.002 3.002 3.002 
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Table 15.3 shows the number of cases seen without the diagnosis. This is calculated from the above two tables, that is by 
subtracting the values of Table 15.2 from Table 15.1. This is gives the value of cell (b+d) of the decision matrix. 
(b+d)  symptoms       signs      
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dry 601.002 601.002 601.002 601.002 601.002 601.002 601.002 
allergic 667.002 667.002 667.002 667.002 667.002 667.002 667.002 
bacterial 700.002 700.002 700.002 700.002 700.002 700.002 700.002 
viral 708.002 708.002 708.002 708.002 708.002 708.002 708.002 
 
 
Table 15.4 shows the number of cases seen that had a positive test result. This represents (a+b) of the decision matrix  
(a+b) symptoms       signs      
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dry 48.002 49.002 59.002 8.002 39.002 5.002 43.002 
allergic 48.002 49.002 59.002 8.002 39.002 5.002 43.002 
bacterial 48.002 49.002 59.002 8.002 39.002 5.002 43.002 
viral 48.002 49.002 59.002 8.002 39.002 5.002 43.002 
 
 
Table 15.5 Observed true positives, that is, cases that tested positive with a positive diagnosis. These represent the (a) 
cell of the decision matrix. 
(a)  symptoms       signs      
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dry 18.001 30.001 29.001 4.001 32.001 1.001 6.001 
allergic 21.001 11.001 7.001 3.001 1.001 0.001 38.001 
bacterial 2.001 1.001 1.001 3.001 0.001 5.001 1.001 
viral 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 1.001 0.001 
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Table 15.6  Observed false positives, that is, cases that had a positive test result but a negative diagnosis. These represent 
the (b) cell of the decision matrix. These are calculated by subtracting values of Table 15.5 (a) from Table 15.4 (a+b)  
(b)  symptoms       signs      
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dry 30.001 19.001 30.001 4.001 7.001 4.001 37.001 
allergic 27.001 38.001 52.001 5.001 38.001 5.001 5.001 
bacterial 46.001 48.001 58.001 5.001 39.001 0.001 42.001 
viral 48.001 49.001 59.001 8.001 39.001 4.001 43.001 
 
Table 15.7 Observed false negatives , that is, cases that had a negative test result but a positive diagnosis. These 
represent the ( c ) cell of the decision matrix. These are calculates by subtracting the values of Table 15.5 (a) from Table 
15.2 (a+c)  
(c)  symptoms       signs      
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dry 92.001 80.001 81.001 106.001 78.001 109.001 104.001 
allergic 23.001 33.001 37.001 41.001 43.001 44.001 6.001 
bacterial 9.001 10.001 10.001 8.001 11.001 6.001 10.001 
viral 3.001 3.001 3.001 3.001 3.001 2.001 3.001 
 
Table 15.8 Observed true negatives, that is, cases that had a negative test result and a negative diagnosis. These 
represent the  (d) cell of the decision matrix and are calculated by subtracting the values of Table 15.6 (b) from Table 15.3 
(b+d)  
(d)  
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dry 571.001 582.001 571.001 597.001 594.001 597.001 564.001 
allergic 640.001 629.001 615.001 662.001 629.001 662.001 662.001 
bacterial 654.001 652.001 642.001 695.001 661.001 700.001 658.001 
viral 660.001 659.001 649.001 700.001 669.001 704.001 665.001 
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Table 15.9 Expected true positives that is expected (a), = [(total cases with the diagnosis) *(total cases testing 
positive)]/(total number of cases). Referring to the decision matrix in Table 1, this is  [(a+c)*(a+b)]/(a+b+c+d).  The values 
in this table are calculated from Tables  15.2, 15.4 and 15.1 
Expected a 
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dry 7.427 7.581 9.128 1.238 6.034 0.774 6.653 
allergic 2.971 3.033 3.651 0.495 2.414 0.310 2.661 
bacterial 0.743 0.758 0.913 0.124 0.604 0.077 0.665 
viral 0.203 0.207 0.249 0.034 0.165 0.021 0.182 
 
Table 15.10 Expected false positives that is, expected (b) = [(total cases without the diagnosis) *(total cases testing 
positive)]/(total number of cases). Referring to the decision matrix in Table 1, this is  [(b+d)*(a+b)]/(a+b+c+d).  The values 
in this table are calculated from Tables  15.3, 15.4 and 15.1 
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dry 40.575 41.421 49.874 6.764 32.968 4.228 36.349 
allergic 45.031 45.969 55.351 7.507 36.588 4.692 40.341 
bacterial 47.259 48.244 58.089 7.878 38.398 4.925 42.337 
viral 47.799 48.795 58.753 7.968 38.837 4.981 42.820 
 
Table 15.11 Expected false negatives, that is, expected (c) = [(total cases with the diagnosis) *(total cases testing 
negative)]/(total number of cases). Referring to the decision matrix in Table 1, this is [(a+c)*(c+d)]/(a+b+c+d).  The values 
in this table are calculated from Tables  15.2, 15.7,15.8 and 15.1 
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dry 102.575 102.421 100.874 108.764 103.968 109.228 103.349 
allergic 41.031 40.969 40.351 43.507 41.588 43.692 41.341 
bacterial 10.259 10.244 10.089 10.878 10.398 10.925 10.337 
viral 2.799 2.795 2.753 2.968 2.837 2.981 2.820 
 
61 
  
Table 15.12 Expected true negatives, that is, expected (d) = [(total cases without the diagnosis) *(total cases testing 
negative)]/(total number of cases). Referring to the decision matrix in Table 1, this is [(b+d)*(c+d)]/(a+b+c+d).  The values 
in this table are calculated from Tables 15.3, 15.7, 15.8 and 15.1 
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dry 560.427 559.581 551.128 594.238 568.034 596.774 564.653 
allergic 621.971 621.033 611.651 659.495 630.414 662.310 626.661 
bacterial 652.743 651.758 641.913 692.124 661.604 695.077 657.665 
viral 660.203 659.207 649.249 700.034 669.165 703.021 665.182 
 
Table 15.13 is the calculated chi square value for (a) incorporating Yates’ correction. Chi square = [(expected value-
observed value) 
2
 -0.5]/ expected value. From the tables above this is calculated by using tables 15.5 and 15.9 
Chi-square for a  
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dry 13.666 63.376 41.113 4.137 107.482 0.096 0.003 
allergic 103.447 18.393 2.224 8.124 0.345 0.118 456.100 
bacterial 0.774 0.087 0.186 45.638 0.017 252.818 0.041 
viral 0.439 0.418 0.255 6.461 0.687 10.904 0.562 
 
Table 15.14 is the calculated chi square value for (b) incorporating Yates’ correction. From the tables above this is 
calculated by using tables 15.6 and 15.10. 
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dry 2.501 11.600 7.525 0.757 19.673 0.018 0.001 
allergic 6.824 1.213 0.147 0.536 0.023 0.008 30.089 
bacterial 0.012 0.001 0.003 0.717 0.000 3.974 0.001 
viral 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.027 0.003 0.046 0.002 
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Table 15.15 is the calculated chi square value for (c) incorporating Yates’ correction. From the tables above this is 
calculated by using tables 15.7 and 15.11. 
Chi-square for c 
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dry 0.989 4.691 3.720 0.047 6.238 0.001 0.000 
allergic 7.490 1.361 0.201 0.092 0.020 0.001 29.361 
bacterial 0.056 0.006 0.017 0.519 0.001 1.791 0.003 
viral 0.032 0.031 0.023 0.074 0.040 0.077 0.036 
 
Table 15.16 is the calculated chi square value for (d) incorporating Yates’ correction. From the tables above this is 
calculated by using tables 15.8 and 15.12. 
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dry 0.181 0.859 0.681 0.009 1.142 0.000 0.000 
allergic 0.494 0.090 0.013 0.006 0.001 0.000 1.937 
bacterial 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.028 0.000 
viral 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 15.17 is the chi square value for a+b+c+d and is calculated as the sum of tables 15.13, 15.14, 15.15 and 15.16 
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dry 17.338 80.526 53.039 4.949 134.534 0.115 0.004 
allergic 118.255 21.057 2.585 8.758 0.389 0.127 517.487 
bacterial 0.843 0.095 0.206 46.883 0.019 258.611 0.044 
viral 0.473 0.451 0.279 6.562 0.730 11.028 0.601 
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Table 15.18 Sensitivity is calculated as the ratio of true positives to all positive diagnosis. Referring to the decision matrix, 
this is the ratio of the cells  (a)/ (a+c) and is calculated from Tables 15.2  and 15.5 
Sensitivity (a/(a+c)) 
 
symptoms       signs      
  it
ch
y 
ey
e
 
b
u
rn
in
g 
ey
e
 
w
at
er
y 
d
is
ch
ar
ge
 
st
ic
ky
 d
is
ch
ar
ge
 
fl
u
o
re
sc
ei
n
 s
ta
in
in
g 
p
al
p
e
b
ra
l r
e
d
n
es
s 
p
al
p
e
b
ra
l p
ap
ill
ae
 
dry 0.164 0.273 0.264 0.036 0.291 0.009 0.055 
allergic 0.477 0.250 0.159 0.068 0.023 0.000 0.864 
bacterial 0.182 0.091 0.091 0.273 0.000 0.455 0.091 
viral 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.333 0.000 
 
Table 15.19 Specificity is calculated as the ratio of true negatives  to all negative diagnosis. Referring to the decision 
matrix, this is the ratio of the cells (d)/ (b+d) and calculated from  tables 15.3 and 15.8 
Specificity (d/(b+d)) 
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dry 0.950 0.968 0.950 0.993 0.988 0.993 0.938 
allergic 0.960 0.943 0.922 0.993 0.943 0.993 0.993 
bacterial 0.934 0.931 0.917 0.993 0.944 1.000 0.940 
viral 0.932 0.931 0.917 0.989 0.945 0.994 0.939 
 
Table 15.20 The positive likelihood ratio is the ratio sensitivity/(1-specificity) and is calculated using tables 15.18 and 
15.19 
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Dry 3.278 8.626 5.281 5.464 24.973 1.367 0.886 
allergic 11.790 4.388 2.041 9.096 0.399 0.003 115.184 
bacterial 2.768 1.327 1.098 38.180 0.002 318189 1.516 
Viral 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.029 0.006 59.005 0.005 
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Table 15.21 Filtered likelihood ratio. Using the chi square value determined for all the cells in Table 15.16,  if the 
calculated chi square value is greater than 13.25 ( the critical chi square value , see section 4.4.6.2 Chi-square filtering in 
the main study) then the corresponding likelihood ratio is used (filtered likelihood ratio) , otherwise the likelihood ratio is 
set to 1 (this would have the least effect of the final post-test probability). 
Positive Likelihood 
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dry 3.278 8.626 5.281 1.000 24.973 1.000 1.000 
allergic 11.790 4.388 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 115.184 
bacterial 1.000 1.000 1.000 38.180 1.000 318189 1.000 
viral 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
4.4.10.1 Use of Microsoft® Excel® spread sheets: Preliminary study 
Using the data from both datasets A and B, two new datasets were created without presentation 
variation. A “dashboard” was created which allowed the selection of the dataset, (circular or non- 
circular and with or without presentation variation) and selection of the value of Chi-square filtration, 
to be used to test the analysis. As these are relational spread sheets, using formulae relating to 
particular cells, calculations could be carried out very quickly. Results from each analysis were 
displayed within the spread sheet and could easily then be copied into the IBM® SPSS® 21 statistical 
package to carry out the decision tree analysis.  
4.4.10.2 Use of Microsoft® Excel® spread sheet: Main study 
As with the preliminary analysis, data from dataset A was used to determine prevalence and 
likelihood ratios. 
Dataset B (non-circular with presentation variation) was used to test the naïve Bayesian sequential 
analysis in two different ways: 
 All test items: naïve Bayesian sequential analysis was carried out using all demographic 
factors, symptoms and signs recorded by the clinician.  
 Recommended tests: Using only symptoms and history, the best tests to confirm the 
diagnoses using the positive likelihood ratio were entered into the analysis.  
Accuracy levels were recorded in a separate spread sheet to facilitate the transfer of data into the 
IBM® SPSS 21 statistical package for further analysis.  
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A dashboard was also created allowing easy data entry, a summary of the pertinent data relating to 
that case (that is, prevalence, comorbidity and presentation variation) and the summary of the 
accuracy levels for the two analyses. A graphical display comparing the accuracy achieved by naïve 
Bayesian sequential analysis to the diagnoses made by the clinician was also displayed on the 
dashboard.   
Figure 6 shows the dashboard where naïve Bayesian sequential analysis identified the same diagnoses 
as the clinician. 
 
Figure 6 Dashboard of Excel spreadsheet showing how naive Bayesian sequential analysis achieves clinical accuracy by 
correctly identifying the same diagnoses as the clinician. Light grey bars represent the diagnoses made by the clinician 
and the blue bars represent the diagnosis made by naïve Bayesian sequential analysis.  
 
Note how the clinician has noted 4 eye conditions and these are shown as the light grey bars. The 
naïve Bayesian sequential analysis has calculated the post-test probabilities and has correctly 
identified the same 4 conditions.  
Each of the 711 cases had to be entered into the analysis and a macro (that is, a set of instructions) 
was created that enabled the naïve Bayesian sequential analysis to enter each case and record the 
data automatically. In this manner all 711 cases of dataset B could be analysed in about 15 minutes.  
 
4.4.11 Decision tree analysis (DTA)  
Decision tree analysis (DTA) is a method of multivariate analysis that is used to classify statistical data 
in a hierarchical manner. In optometry, DTA has previously been applied to the: 
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 Identification of refractive error (137); 
 Interpretation of data from videokeratography in a both quantative and objective manner 
(138); 
 Classification of keratoconus (139); 
 Identification of factors which may contribute to the loss of visual and optical performance of 
in myopes wearing silicone hydrogel lenses  (140); 
 Assessment of the cost effectiveness of school based screening and primary eye care in 
relation to the supply of spectacles to correct refractive error in rural and urban areas in 
India. (141); 
 Assessment of the factors influencing habits and attitudes to retinoscopy (142). 
For the present study, DTA was considered suitable as it can handle both discrete and continuous 
variables. DTA can also be used for primary classification of data, where data is analysed and leads to 
a decision being made for further classification. However, this study used DTA to determine the level 
of influence of the three independent factors (prevalence, comorbidity and presentation variation) on 
the final accuracy achieved. Each independent factor was categorised to enable a preliminary analysis 
of the influence of each factor (see 5.2.1 Distribution and categorization of prevalence, comorbidity 
and presentation variation) 
Previous studies have used Regression tree analysis and algorithms such as C4.5 and ID3 to carry out 
decision tree analysis (143). More recently, Dunstone (142) used the same software as the current 
study (IBM® SPSS® 21). This software was used to perform DTA with the Chi-squared Automatic 
Interaction Detection (CHAID) tree growing method which enabled investigation of the influences of 
prevalence, presentation variation and comorbidity (each being treated as independent variables) on 
the accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis (the dependent variable). CHAID was able to 
indicate the relative importance of each independent variable. (144) 
To simplify interpretation of the decision trees, the dependent and independent variables were 
assigned categories. That is, accuracy was categorised as “1” (meaning not accurate) or “2” (meaning 
accurate), prevalence as “rare” or “common”, comorbidity as “absent” or “present” and presentation 
variation as “high” or “low”. By assigning these categories to the variables, all the data was treated as 
being discrete.  
An alternative form of analysis (stepwise multiple regression) was considered not to be suitable as it 
required all variables to be continuous (142). 
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DTA gives rise to decision trees containing parent nodes from which child nodes grow. For the 
analyses presented in this study, the default settings were used, that is, parent nodes had to contain 
at least 100 cases while child nodes had to contain at least 50 cases. This was possible as the sample 
was large enough to allow at least 2 levels of tree growing. This allowed for the influence of the 3 
independent variable to be displayed in the tree.  
The following CHAID statistical criteria were also kept at the default levels: 
 Significance level p=0.05  
 Chi-square statistic – Pearson  
Using Pearson (which is the default statistic) enabled faster calculations within the software, and the 
sample was deemed to be large enough to allow this. SPSS® recommends that, for small samples, the 
likelihood ratio is preferred but calculations may take longer (145) 
The Bonferroni correction (although default) was not used (its use is sometimes recommended in 
order to avoid a Type II error; that is, accepting a hypothesis in error). Armstrong (146) suggests that 
use of the Bonferroni correction in this type of decision tree analysis reduces the power of the 
statistical test  
 
4.5 Summary 
Having outlined the methods that are common to all analyses carried out in this study, Chapter 5 
presents the findings of the preliminary analysis while chapter 6 presents those of the main analysis. 
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5. Findings of the preliminary analysis 
This chapter shows the findings of the preliminary study on 15 test outcomes and 10 diagnoses. The 
objectives of the preliminary study were to determine the influence of circularity, prevalence, 
comorbidity, presentation variation and Chi-square on the accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential 
analysis.  
 
5.1 Selection of tests and diagnoses  
Five non-definitive test outcomes were selected, including age (over 50 years) and 4 symptoms. These 
represented the occurrence of test outcomes that may be common to several diagnoses and might, 
therefore, challenge Bayesian analysis. The “textbook” relationships between these 5 non-definitive 
test outcomes and the 10 chosen diagnoses are shown in Table 16 
The 10 diagnoses were selected using two criteria. The first criterion was that each diagnosis was 
required to have one definitive test. This ensured that the accuracy of Bayesian analysis was not 
underestimated through failure to make a diagnosis for which there were no definitive signs. The 
second criterion was that the selected diagnoses had to represent the full range of observed 
prevalence and that the prevalence of each selected disease was approximately equal in datasets A 
and B (see Figure 7).  This ensured that dataset A (used to generate pre-test odds and likelihood ratios 
prior to performing Bayesian analyses) contained the same distribution of diagnoses as dataset B 
(upon which Bayesian analyses were performed). 
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Uncorrected ametropia    * *     *                   
Uncorrected presbyopia  * * *       *                 
Uncompensated heterophoria     *         *               
Dry eye        * *       *             
Allergic Conjuctivitis        * *         *           
Pinguecula *                   *         
Cataract   *                   *       
Diabetic retinopathy *                       *     
Macula hole  * *                       *   
Primary open angle glaucoma *                           * 
Table 16  The 10 diagnoses selected for analysis together with their associated definitive signs and associated reported symptoms 
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Prevalence of the 10 selected diagnoses on datasets A (blue bars) and B (red bars) are shown in Figure 
5-1. No statistically significant difference was found between prevalence of each of the 10 selected 
diagnoses in datasets A and B (Chi square = 7.83, degrees of freedom = 9, P > 0.05). 
 
 
Figure 7 Prevalence in Datasets A & B 
 
 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Distribution and categorization of prevalence, comorbidity and presentation variation  
Prevalence (or median prevalence) ranged from 0.001 to 0.80 with a median of 0.56. Comorbidity 
ranged from 0 (no eye conditions present) to 6 (6 eye conditions present) with a median of between 1 
(no comorbidity as only 1 eye condition was present) and 2. This indicated that approximately 50% of 
the sample showed some degree of comorbidity. Presentation variation ranged from 0 to 7 items 
with a median of 1 item.  
For the purposes of decision tree analyses, prevalence, comorbidity and presentation variation were 
categorised as shown in Table 17 
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Prevalence  
  
> 0.56 (common) 
<= 0.56 (rare) 
Comorbidity  
 
<=1 (absent) 
>1 (present) 
Presentation 
variation  
<=2 (low) 
>2 (high) 
Table 17 Categories of prevalence, comorbidity and presentation variation used for decision tree analyses.  
  
5.2.2 Overall accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis 
Circularity was present in the analyses denoted AA (Table 18) as accuracy was investigated by using 
the pre-test odds and likelihood ratios generated from dataset A to make diagnoses on the test 
outcomes of dataset A. Circularity was absent in analyses denoted AB (Table 18) as accuracy was 
investigated by using the pre-test odds and likelihood ratios generated from dataset A to make 
diagnoses on the test outcomes of dataset B. Presentation variation was absent in analyses 
performed on datasets A and B that contained cases with “textbook” test outcomes for all diagnoses. 
Presentation variation was present in analyses performed on datasets A and B that contained cases 
with observed test outcomes for all diagnoses. Percentage accuracy represented the percentage of 
cases for which the diagnoses made by the clinician (the author) appeared at the top of a list 
generated by Bayesian analysis. 
Analysis 
 
Percentage accuracy 
AA (circularity present, presentation variation absent) 100.0% 
AB (circularity absent, presentation variation absent) 100.0% 
AA (circularity present,  presentation variation present) 94.5% 
AB (circularity absent, presentation variation present) 94.0% 
Table 18  The overall percentage accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis achieved with and without circularity and 
presentation variation. . 
 
Table 18 shows the overall percentage accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis with and 
without circularity and presentation variation. Accuracy of 100% was achieved when presentation 
variation was absent. This, in a sense, proved the basic concept of applying this form of naïve 
Bayesian analysis to the sort of clinical data collected in the setting of primary care optometry.  
Accuracy fell be up to 6% when presentation variation was present. The presence of circularity with 
presentation variation artificially increased the accuracy by 0.5%.  
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Counter intuitively, removal of the Chi-square filter did not influence the accuracy of Bayesian 
analysis when presentation variation was absent and increased accuracy by 0.4% when presentation 
variation was present.  
5.2.3 Decision Trees Analysis 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Decision tree analysis for analysis AA (circular analysis with presentation variation) 
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Figure 9 Decision tree analysis for analysis AB (non- circular analysis with presentation variation) 
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Separate decision tree analyses were performed for naïve Bayesian sequential analyses carried out 
with circularity present (AA- Figure 8) and absent (AB-Figure 9) in the presence of presentation 
variation. The overall accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis was found to be 94.5% for 
analysis AA and 94% for analysis AB. Decision trees exhibited up to 3 levels of branching (denoted as 
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd level of influence). The hierarchical influences of prevalence, comorbidity and 
presentation are indicated by the level of influence in which they are found. The percentage of cases 
represented in each level is shown.  The percentage accuracy achieved by Bayesian analysis is also 
shown at each level. 
In both analyses, prevalence influenced accuracy the most, followed by presentation variation and, 
only when circularity was absent, comorbidity.  
The finding that comorbidity did not influence the accuracy of Bayesian analysis when circularity was 
present is consistent with previous research carried out on patients with dementia (127).The present 
study is, however, as far as the author is aware, the first to have carried out Bayesian analysis when 
circularity is absent and to have also considered the influence of prevalence and presentation 
variation. 
In the presence of circularity, 100% accuracy was achieved for 57.8% of all cases. All of these 
exhibited eye conditions of common prevalence. Accuracy of 93.4% was achieved in 25.7% of all 
cases, all of which exhibited eye conditions of rare prevalence in combination with low presentation 
variation. Accuracy of 76.9% was achieved in 16.5% of cases, all of which exhibited eye conditions of 
rare prevalence in combination with high presentation variation. This finding was very encouraging as 
it showed that accuracy of over 76% was achievable even for the most challenging cases; those with 
atypical presentations of rare eye conditions. 
However, Bayesian analyses lacking circularity were of most interest in the context of the future 
application of this form of artificial intelligence to new cases. Under these conditions, Bayesian 
analysis achieved 100% accuracy for cases exhibiting eye conditions of common prevalence and this 
occurred for 57.5% of all cases. Accuracy of 95.6% was achieved in 12.8% of all cases, all of which 
exhibited eye conditions of rare prevalence in combination with low presentation variation and no 
comorbidity. Accuracy of 87% was achieved in 15.2% of all cases, all of which exhibited eye conditions 
of rare prevalence in combination with low presentation variation and comorbidity. Accuracy of 
75.7% was achieved in 14.5% of all cases, all of which exhibited eye conditions of rare prevalence in 
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combination with high presentation variation but with no comorbidity. Therefore, even with 
circularity present, accuracy of over 75% was achievable in the most challenging cases. 
 
5.3 Summary  
The preliminary study, carried out on 10 diagnoses and 15 test outcomes, showed that naïve Bayesian 
sequential analysis could make diagnoses without error in the absence of presentation variation. 
Accuracy dropped by only 6% when presentation variation existed. Circularity artificially elevated 
accuracy by 0.5%. Surprisingly, removal of Chi-square filtering increased accuracy by 0.4%. Decision 
tree analysis showed that accuracy was influenced primarily by prevalence followed by presentation 
variation and comorbidity.  Chapter 6 presents the findings of the main study that was carried out to 
explore whether these encouraging findings also arise when naïve Bayesian sequential analysis is 
applied to diagnoses that may not necessarily have definitive tests. Chapter 6 also presents an 
investigation carried out to determine whether positive likelihood ratios could be used to identify 
diagnostic tests.  
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6. Findings of the main study  
This chapter shows the findings of the main study on 105 tests and 35 diagnoses. The objectives of 
this study were (1) to re-examine the influence of prevalence, comorbidity, presentation variation 
and Chi-square filtration on the accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis for diagnoses that may 
or may not have definitive tests and (2) to explore the use of positive likelihood ratios to identify 
diagnostic tests.  
  
6.1 Selection of tests and diagnoses 
The 35 diagnoses represented all diagnoses that were present in both datasets (A and B). The 
requirement in selection 5.1 Selection of tests and diagnoses to have one definitive test associated 
with each diagnosis was removed in this analysis to reflect clinical reality. Likewise, the 105 tests 
represented all tests that were present in both datasets (A and B).  
 
6.2 The use of positive likelihood ratios to select diagnostic tests 
Recall that the magnitude of each positive likelihood ratios gives the amount by which the post-test 
odds of any given diagnosis rises or falls after a positive test result (section 3.1 Decision Matrices). 
Logically, then, the test outcome with the largest positive likelihood ratio associated with a given 
diagnosis is that which has greatest diagnostic value for that diagnosis. Previous workers have hinted 
that this would work (92), or have actually tried it out (62). As far as the author is aware, this has not 
been tested in the field of optometry. Using Chi-square filtered positive likelihood ratios for this 
purpose could help optometrists select the most appropriate diagnostic tests. Exploring the potential 
for this was one of the key objectives of the main analysis.  
 
An overview of the scheme adopted now follows. For each case, naïve Bayesian sequential analysis 
was performed until all positive test outcomes for demographic items (ethnicity and age), symptoms 
and history items (ocular and medical) had been entered. In other words, the history and symptoms 
part of the eye examination had been completed. This included 54 of the 105 test outcomes. At this 
point, diagnostic tests (all clinical signs) were recommended based on those that had the highest Chi-
square filtered positive likelihood ratios associated with the top 6 diagnoses (these diagnoses being 
ranked according to their post-test probability at that point).  Only 6 diagnoses were shown as the 
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maximum comorbidity was known to be equal to 6 (see 5.2.1 Distribution and categorization of 
prevalence, comorbidity and presentation variation). Logically, this would only lead to the 
recommendation of 6 of the remaining 51 diagnostic tests that represented signs. Naïve Bayesian 
sequential analyses were then resumed until all positive outcomes of these 6 diagnostic tests had 
been entered. At this point, the end of the eye examination, all diagnoses were again ranked 
according to their post-test probability. The accuracy of the diagnoses was calculated (as described in 
4.4.8 Accuracy) and compared to the accuracy achieved when positive test findings for all 105 test 
outcomes had been entered. 
 
This approach would only work in optometric practice if optometrist had the autonomy to select 
diagnostic tests on their diagnostic value alone, as medical practitioners do. However, in reality, 
optometrists have to perform certain tests to meet medico-legal obligations. Nevertheless, if it could 
be demonstrated that positive likelihood ratios could identify fewer but more diagnostically valuable 
tests without a loss in diagnostic accuracy, then the approach tested in this study might, in the 
fullness of time, be considered medico-legally acceptable. 
This approach has another potential advantage – reduced “chair-time”. The 51 test outcomes, 
representing clinical signs, could actually be grouped into just 17 ophthalmic procedures. Appendix III 
(Ophthalmic Procedures) shows the ophthalmic procedures in the first column and the signs 
associated with these procedures that were used in the analysis in the second column. Each 
ophthalmic procedure included between 1 and 13 of the 51 test items. For example one of the test 
procedures was fundus examination. This included 3 test items: haemorrhages, cotton wool spots and 
exudates. The thinking here was that if an optometrist invested the “chair time” to examine the 
fundus then they would very likely detect any of the 3 test items. So, if 3 of the 6 recommended 
diagnostic tests fell under fundus examination then the “chair time” invested in those 3 
recommended diagnostic tests would only amount to that involved with carrying out 1 ophthalmic 
procedure.  Now, if the 6 recommended diagnostic tests represented 1 test item from each of 6 
different ophthalmic procedures then the total reduction of “chair time” would be equal to ((17 – 6) / 
17) x 100 = 65%. On the other hand, if all 6 recommended diagnostic tests fell under just one 
ophthalmic procedure (this would be theoretically possible for ophthalmic procedures involving 
examination of the conjunctiva, cornea and optic disc) then the total reduction of “chair time” would 
be equal to ((17 – 1) / 17) x 100 = 94%. So, adopting the approach of recommending just 6 out of 17 
diagnostic tests could reduce “chair time” by anything between 65% and 94%,  
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Given what has been said above, it becomes clear that if this approach reduces “chair time” without 
compromising diagnostic accuracy (that is, clinical vigilance), then this might be of great interest to 
practices that rely on high volume eye examinations to remain economically viable. 
Dataset A was used to generate the Chi-square filtered positive likelihood ratios used to identify 
recommended diagnostic tests for each diagnosis. Two criteria were used for recommended test 
selection. The first was, as mentioned earlier, that the recommended test had to exhibit the largest 
positive likelihood ratio for the diagnosis in question. The second criterion was that the 
recommended test had to be the sole test item with the largest positive likelihood ratio for that 
diagnosis. That is, there should be no ties between test items exhibiting maximum positive likelihood 
ratios. These criteria were met for 34 of the 35 diagnoses; the diagnosis of hypertensive retinopathy 
lacked a recommended diagnostic test. It is worth considering the loss of accuracy that this might 
cause. Given that Bayesian analysis was carried out on the cases in the dataset B, it follows that the 
potential loss of accuracy, when basing diagnoses on recommended tests, amounts to the number of 
cases in dataset B that had hypertensive retinopathy. This amounted to 2 (0.3% of dataset B). 
Therefore, little loss in accuracy was anticipated. Nevertheless, the possibility that this type of 
accuracy loss can occur should be noted when considering this approach to making diagnoses in the 
future.     
 
6.3 Results  
All naïve Bayesian sequential analyses carried out in the main study were made without circularity 
(that is, Bayesian analyses were carried out using initial pre-test odds and positive likelihood ratios 
from dataset A in order to make diagnoses based on positive test outcomes from dataset B) and 
included natural presentation variations observed in dataset B. 
 
6.3.1 Overall accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis on all test items 
The overall percentage accuracy of Bayesian analysis, when diagnoses were based on positive test 
outcomes from all 105 test items, was 75% when Chi-square filtering was used and 74% when Chi-
square filtering was removed. As found in the preliminary analysis, Chi-square filtering had little 
impact on accuracy.  
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Recall that the accuracy found under the same conditions (circularity absent, presentation variation 
present) in the preliminary study was 94% (Table 18). The question arose as to what might have 
caused this 20% drop in accuracy. 
6.3.1.1 Possible causes of reduced accuracy: lack of definitive tests 
It has already been suggested that this was due to some of the 35 diagnoses lacking definitive tests. 
The definitive test selected by naïve Bayesian sequential analysis had the highest positive likelihood 
ratio for that particular test/diagnosis combination. Of the 35 diagnoses, 34 diagnoses had definitive 
tests associated with them. However on closer inspection, some of these test/diagnosis associations 
were spurious and in normal clinical practice would not be associated with the diagnosis (147). Of the 
35 diagnoses only 29 were found to have a test that would be associated in clinical practice; that is 
17% of the diagnoses lacked definitive tests or tests that were equivocal at best.  
Figure 10 shows how the diagnosis of hypertensive retinopathy is missed by the naïve Bayesian 
sequential analysis because there were no associated definitive signs. Similarly, nuclear cataract had 
equivocal signs associated with the diagnosis (hazy view of fundus, small retinal haemorrhages), so 
again this diagnosis is missed. 
  
Figure 10 Due to a lack of a definitive sign, the diagnosis of hypertensive retinopathy is missed completely. Similarly, the 
diagnosis of nuclear cataract is missed as the signs associated with this diagnosis (hazy view of fundus, small retinal 
haemorrhages) are equivocal at best  
  
Missed Hypertensive retinopathy 
Missed nuclear cataract 
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The diagnoses lacking a definitive test identified by the use of likelihood ratios were:  
 Allergic dermatitis (0.2%) 
 Bacterial Conjunctivitis (1.6%) 
 Corneal abrasion (1.7%) 
 Cataract – cortical (1.3%) 
 Primary open angle glaucoma (0.8%) 
 Hypertensive retinopathy (0.3%) 
Prevalence of each condition for dataset B is given in brackets. Thus, diagnoses with rare prevalence, 
which lack a definitive sign, may account for part of the drop in accuracy.   
 
 6.3.1.2 Possible causes of reduced accuracy: reduced potency of definitive tests 
There is, however, another possible explanation. Might the positive likelihood ratios of the definitive 
tests of the preliminary analysis have been much higher in value that those of the main study? In 
other words, might the definitive test of the preliminary study have had greater diagnostic power (or 
potency) than those of the main study.  
This was investigated by taking the average of all the LR+ associated with a diagnosis and multiplying 
this by the prevalence (thus giving the weighted average). The average of all the weighted averages 
was then compared between the two studies. The preliminary study average was found to be 1,740 
and the main study average was found to be 82. This suggested that there was more than 20 times 
difference in the potency of the tests used in the preliminary study and the main study. It is pertinent 
to note that in the preliminary study the tests were “chosen” by the author, whereas in the main 
study the tests were “chosen” by using the Bayesian analysis (that is, identifying the best 
test/diagnosis associations by using the LR+). The comparison of the positive likelihood ratios for the 
preliminary study and the main study are shown in Appendix V -Comparison of LR+ between the 
preliminary study and the main study.  
 
6.3.1.3 Possible causes of reduced accuracy: lack of recorded signs  
Loss of accuracy (that is, where naïve Bayesian sequential analysis did not concur with that of the 
clinician) occurred in 26% percent of cases.  Individual cases were further examined to elicit the 
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possible causes of the drop in accuracy. One such loss of accuracy was found to be due to the lack of 
a recorded sign associated with the diagnosis.  
Figure 11 shows a diagnosis of pinguecula that is missed completely as there were no recorded 
associated signs. Three eye conditions were recorded in this case and the other 2 were correctly 
identified.  
 
Figure 11 Naïve Bayesian sequential analysis misses a diagnosis as there is no recorded sign. 
Other eye conditions that were diagnosed but were lacking in recorded signs by the clinician were 
corneal arcus, pterygium, and corneal abrasion. 
Further, if incomplete signs are recorded, then the naïve Bayesian sequential analysis identifies the 
clinician’s diagnoses, but included other diagnosis as well. (Figure 12) 
  
Missed diagnosis-pinguecula 
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Figure 12 Incomplete recording of signs achieves partially accurate diagnoses, but also achieves high probability for a 
spurious diagnosis. In this case, the two diagnoses recorded by the clinician were “dry eye” and “allergic conjunctivitis”. 
However, the only sign that was recorded was “conjunctival small papillae”. The diagnosis for the dry eye has been made 
on the history and symptoms. A high diagnostic probability for “uncorrected ametropia” is also seen, which was not 
recorded by the clinician; thus in this case although the original diagnoses were confirmed by naïve Bayesian sequential 
analysis, accuracy is lost by the introduction of a spurious diagnosis. 
 
6.3.1.4 Possible causes of reduced accuracy: influence of small likelihood ratios 
Could a large number of small positive likelihood ratios have been the cause of the reduced accuracy? 
Likelihood ratios less than 1 diminish the probability of a diagnosis. However, where the positive 
likelihood ratio is greater than 1, the effect of a large number of such small likelihood ratios can have 
a cumulative effect raising the probabilities of a diagnosis. (130) 
Sixty eight of the test/diagnosis combinations had a positive likelihood ratio of greater than 1 and of 
these 59 had a positive likelihood ratio of greater than 5. It would, therefore, seem very unlikely that 
a preponderance of smaller positive likelihood ratios (of between 1 and 2) could have a significant 
effect on the final diagnosis.  
 
6.3.2 Overall accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis on recommended test items  
The overall percentage accuracy of Bayesian analysis, when diagnoses were based on just 6 
recommended tests, was 73% when Chi-square filtering was used and 70% when Chi-square filtering 
was removed. This was an encouraging finding as it indicated that basing diagnoses on just 6 
recommended tests (which, as mentioned earlier, could reduce “chair-time” by between 65% and 
94%) also bought about a 3% increase in accuracy when Chi-square filtering was used. 
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6.3.2.1 The quality of recommended test items 
The quality of recommended tests for each of the 35 diagnoses was investigated. The author used her 
clinical judgement to rate each recommended test using a Likert scale of 1 to 5; in which 1 
represented strong disagreement and 5 represented strong agreement. The maximum score possible 
was 175 (that is, maximum score of 5 per test multiplied by the total number of tests, 35). The score 
for the analysis with Chi-square filtering was 150 and without the Chi-square filtering was 137. 
Expressed as a percentage of the highest possible score, the tests with Chi-square filtering achieved 
85.7% and without Chi-square filtering achieved 78.3%. These findings suggested that Chi-square 
filtering improved recommended test selection – albeit by a small degree.  The recommended tests 
selected by using the maximum likelihood ratios are shown on page 122. 
6.4 Decision tree analysis 
Decision tree analyses was carried out to further explore the hierarchical influences of prevalence, 
comorbidity and presentation variation on the accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential analyses carried 
out in the main study. Separate decision tree analyses were performed for Bayesian analyses carried 
out with all test items and with recommended tests. Logically, the percentages of cases found at each 
level in the decision tree were identical in both analyses (after all, both analyses were carried out on 
dataset B). The decision tree structure was also identical in both analyses showing that prevalence 
influenced accuracy the most, followed by comorbidity and then by presentation variation. Compared 
to the decision tree analyses performed in the preliminary study (section 5.2.3 Decision Trees 
Analysis), comorbidity had increased its hierarchical position from last to second. 
The decision tree analyses based on all test items and recommended tests are shown in Figure 13 and 
Figure 14, respectively. 
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Figure 13 Decision tree analysis for naive Bayesian sequential analysis using all 105 test items comprising of non-circular 
data with presentation variation  
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Figure 14 Decision tree analysis based on only recommended tests following history and symptoms comprising of non-
circular data with presentation variation 
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The only differences in both analyses were the accuracy levels achieved. Even so, the differences 
observed were only subtle so that the accuracy trends were identical. In cases exhibiting eye 
conditions of common prevalence (52.3% of all cases), both analyses achieved 100% accuracy. In 
cases exhibiting eye conditions of rare prevalence without comorbidity (15.2% of all cases), analyses 
based on all test item and recommended tests achieved 64.8% and 70.4% accuracy, respectively. In 
cases exhibiting eye conditions of rare prevalence with comorbidity and high presentation variation 
(19.4% of all cases), analyses based on all test item and recommended tests achieved 48.6% and 
44.9% accuracy, respectively. In cases exhibiting eye conditions of rare prevalence with comorbidity 
and low presentation variation (13.1% of all cases), analyses based on all test item and recommended 
tests achieved 2.2% and 6.5% accuracy, respectively.  
The reason for the paradoxical elevation of accuracy in cases with high presentation variation 
compared to low presentation variation remains obscure. On closer examination of individual cases, 
lack of accuracy appeared again due to lack of definitive tests for some diagnoses and missing 
diagnostic signs (see 6.3.1.1 Possible causes of reduced accuracy: lack of definitive tests; 6.3.1.3 
Possible causes of reduced accuracy: lack of recorded signs).  
 
6.5 Summary  
The main study, on 35 diagnoses and 105 test outcomes exhibiting observed presentation variations, 
showed that naïve Bayesian sequential analysis, without circularity, achieved accuracy of 72% when 
all clinical signs were entered. So the encouraging findings of the preliminary analysis (chapter 5) 
were not sustained. Removal of Chi-square filtering made little difference. The 20% drop in accuracy, 
compared to the preliminary analysis, was attributed to the fact that some diagnoses lacked strong 
diagnostic signs, a lack of potency of diagnostic tests used or a lack of recorded diagnostic signs.  
The main study also explored the use of Chi-square filtered positive likelihood ratios, calculated after 
history and symptoms, to recommend diagnostic signs to look for. This approach reduced “chair 
time” by between 65% and 94% while maintaining clinical vigilance. In fact, when compared to the 
entry of all positive test findings, the accuracy increased by 1% when only recommended signs were 
entered. Chi-square filtering improved recommended test selection.  
Decision tree analysis showed that accuracy was influenced primarily by prevalence, followed by 
comorbidity and presentation variation. The influence of these factors was also greater than that 
observed in the preliminary analysis. Accuracy fell dramatically in 13% of the cases exhibiting eye 
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conditions of rare prevalence compounded with comorbidity and low presentation variation (13.1% 
of all cases). Here, analyses based on all test item and recommended tests achieved 2.2% and 6.5% 
accuracy, respectively.  
The above analyses were all carried out using only positive likelihood ratios as only positive test 
outcomes had been recorded. As a result of these findings, it is strongly recommended that, in future 
studies, Bayesian analysis should be based on positive and negative test findings.  
Chapter 7 provides a review of the thesis findings and makes recommendations for further studies.  
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7. Discussion  
This study was designed to investigate the influences of prevalence, comorbidity, presentation 
variation and circularity on the application of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis to make differential 
diagnoses in the optometric primary care setting. This study also investigated the extent to which Chi-
square filtering maximised accuracy. Given the widespread use of Bayesian analysis in many other 
areas of our daily lives, it is surprising that this is the first investigation of its kind in the field of 
optometry. Even where similar investigations have been carried out in other medical fields, none 
have explored the potential sources of error investigated in the present study.    
One of the key features of Bayesian analysis, in this context, is that it accounts for the prevalence of 
each diagnosis. Reliable estimates of prevalence are, therefore, essential and were only possible if all 
eligible data was included in the analysis. It soon became apparent that asking for patient consent 
raised subtle trust issues. Therefore, it became necessary to proceed without patient consent and this 
became a major ethical issue standing in the way of the continuation of this study. Risks to patients 
would be the accidental disclosure of clinical data and yet the advantage of using Bayesian analysis to 
improve the accuracy of differential diagnosis had vast potential in preventing avoidable blindness.  
Fortunately, precedent for the use of completely anonymised clinical data without prior consent 
appears in Section 3.3 of the Guidelines for Researcher and Research Ethics Committees on 
Psychiatric Research involving Human Participants (133), which states that…“Individual consent 
should not be necessary for group analysis of anonymised data but the ethics committee should 
ensure that the required anonymisation has been achieved before the data are made available” and 
…“the ethics committee should have specifically agreed to exempt the research from the general 
requirement for individual consent from each research subject. In that respect, our recommendation 
on research using records and archived samples follow the same principles as those that apply to 
clinical audit”. A not insignificant breakthrough occurred when the research ethics committees of 
Aston University and the Tanzanian National Institute of Medical Research made this study possible 
by accepting this guidance. 
The findings of this study indicate that naïve Bayesian sequential analysis works without error when 
variations in the presentation of various eye conditions or diseases are removed. The preliminary 
study served as a proof of concept in that prevalence and comorbidity did not render the application 
of naïve Bayesian analysis to primary care clinical data a “non-starter”. The main study showed that 
naïve Bayesian analysis can be applied to a wealth of clinical data with some accuracy.  
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The sample of 1422 cases examined in this study seems adequate for the purposes of evaluating the 
factors affecting naïve Bayesian analysis, given that previous studies of ocular conditions in primary 
eye care have been carried out on samples of between 1438 and 5308 cases (148) (149) (150) (151) 
(152). 
In the preliminary study, 100% accuracy was achieved when there was no presentation variation in 
the data. A surprisingly small fall in accuracy (6%) did, however, occur when observed presentation 
variations were included in the analysis. Though some inconsistency was evident in the findings, 
analyses indicated that prevalence, comorbidity and presentation variation reduced accuracy. 
Prevalence was consistently highest in the hierarchy of these influencing factors.  There were initial 
concerns about circularity but even this exerted a surprisingly small (0.5%) artificial elevation of 
accuracy. 
Using all the available data, naïve Bayesian sequential analysis achieved 72% accuracy in data with 
low presentation variation. A similar study carried out on the detection of pancreatic cancer using 
sequential Bayesian analysis involving clinical, laboratory and image data achieved 67% accuracy 
(153). Using Chi-square filtered positive likelihood ratios to recommend between 65% and 94% fewer 
confirmatory tests, no fall in the accuracy of naïve Bayesian sequential analysis (73%) arose, thus 
opening the way for this form of artificial intelligence to direct problem-orientated eye examinations. 
This has potential in an environment in which commercial pressures demand reduced “chair-time”. 
Recall that Warner, in his early computerised diagnostic program for congenital heart conditions, had 
a total of 54 tests but this could be reduced to 7 or 8 tests to give the proper diagnosis (61). 
In the preliminary study, the tests chosen were such that they had definitive links with each of the 
diagnoses. In the main study however, not all the tests were definitive and this may have led to a 20% 
reduction in accuracy.  
Accuracy could be further improved by recording negative test findings, thereby allowing the use of 
negative likelihood ratios.  
No attempt was made in this study to calculate confidence limits for sensitivity, specificity and 
likelihood ratios as this did not assist Bayesian analysis. In the future, however, these quantities could 
be published with confidence limits as an indicator of their reliability.  
Attempts made to remove circularity (3.5 Circularity) involved splitting the data into subsamples A 
(containing the first half of the data collected) and B (containing the second half of the data 
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collected). The first sample was used to calculate prevalence and likelihood ratios. The second sample 
was used to test the accuracy of Bayesian analyses carried out using the calculated prevalence and 
likelihood ratios. An alternative approach would have been to randomly pick the data used to 
calculate prevalence and likelihood ratios and then to test accuracy on the remaining data. As these 
were both samples from the same population, future studies could calculate prevalence and 
likelihood ratios from one clinic and test the accuracy of Bayesian analyses, based on these quantities, 
in another clinic.  
Decision tree analysis (DTA) was applied to broadly categorised data; for example, prevalence was 
categorised as being high and low. This led to uncomplicated decision trees that could be interpreted 
easily. Initial analysis using DTA on independent variables that had not been broadly categorised 
resulted in confusing results. However, future work could be directed towards narrower 
categorization of the independent variables. For example, to understand at what level of prevalence 
does the accuracy drop below 100%? (see Figure 8, Figure 9, Figure 13 and Figure 14).  
Accuracy may also be improved by the greater use of tests with multiple levels, such as for cup-to-disc 
ratios, and intraocular pressure measurements. Different likelihood ratios for the different levels of a 
test (108), can be calculated, which may also provide useful information about an individual patient 
and thereby making the diagnosis more customised for each patient.  
This is shown in the example below, derived from the present study, where age was recorded in 
multiple levels and positive likelihood ratios are shown for uncorrected presbyopia (see Table 19) 
 Positive Likelihood 
ratio Age             
  0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 
n 43 112 111 117 128 94 67 
LR+ for uncorrected 
presbyopia  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 12.18 2.47 1.46 
Table 19 The Variation of positive likelihood ratios for uncorrected presbyopia with age. 
Uncorrected presbyopia (or the need for a near vision correction) is not generally seen before the age 
of 40. So, positive likelihood ratios of below 1 are seen up to 40 years of age. Between the ages of 41-
50, most patients need a new reading prescription, or a change to a current one and this is reflected 
by the high positive likelihood ratio recorded for that age group. The falling positive likelihood ratios 
after 50 years of age reflect the fact that progressively fewer patients require further change to their 
reading prescription. Table 19 therefore, illustrates how multiple levels of test outcomes can 
generate useful information about a patient’s individual characteristics, such as age.   
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Looking at the challenges for eye care today in terms of the aging demographic throughout the world, 
the main conditions that have to be addressed in order to prevent avoidable blindness are cataract, 
diabetic retinopathy, glaucoma and age related macular degeneration (3). Table 20 shows how 
positive likelihood ratios reveal that all of these conditions are more likely to occur with advancing 
age. The positive likelihood ratios for diabetic retinopathy are reduced to zero at the age group 81-90 
and this may be due to the fact that there is a poor survival rate at this age with diabetes. Similarly, 
the positive likelihood ratio for age-related macular degeneration also drops to zero. This may be due 
to the fact that few people were actually seen in the practice of this age group in the data that was 
analysed (only 2 patients of this age group were seen) , or that they may be attending a specialist low 
vision clinic and may not require the services of a community optometrist.  
Positive likelihood 
ratio (LR+) 
Age                 
  0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40 41-50 51-60 61-70 71-80 81-90 
n 43 112 111 117 128 94 67 31 8 
Cataract - nuclear 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.60 1.48 0.97 6.13 37.66 
Primary open angle 
glaucoma 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 1.37 3.00 2.96 1.95 9.76 
Diabetic retinopathy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.54 1.88 3.36 7.03 0.00 
Age-related macular 
degeneration 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.80 15.78 0.00 
Table 20  The variation of positive likelihood ratios with age for cataract, primary open angle glaucoma, diabetic 
retinopathy and age-related macular degeneration. 
 
It is pertinent to note that a completely novel method of evaluating test/diagnosis association was 
considered in this study- Chi-square filtering. In the past, several other methods have been used to 
evaluate diagnostic tests. Aspinall & Hill (154) used receiver operator characteristic curves (ROC) to 
determine the best cut-off values for a positive or negative test outcome (ideally maximising true 
positives and minimising false negatives), whereas Gilchrist (100) used a weighted kappa and QROC 
curves.  
Figure 15 shows an ROC curve with the dashed line representing the indecision line. That is  where 
the diagnostic information is so poor, that cases with or without the condition or disease cannot be 
differentiated except by chance.  The top left hand corner of the graph is where sensitivity and 
specificity is at its best. Each curve represents a test with the sensitivity and specificity for a certain 
value.  A point on the curve that is furthest away from this line and closest to the top left hand corner 
of the graph represents the best criteria for a positive or negative test outcome.  This point ensures 
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Sensitivity  
P(T+|D+) 
1-Specificity  
P(T+|D-) 
Specificity  
P(T-|D-) 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0 
0 
0 
A 
A 
B 
maximum true positives and the minimum false negatives.  Curve B represents a test that is more 
likely to identify true positives and true negatives than the test represented by Curve A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the data from Crick and Daubs (155) using intraocular pressure for detecting glaucomatous 
visual field loss, Aspinall & Hill used ROC curves to determine the intraocular pressure that predicts 
visual field loss caused by primary open angle glaucoma. The ROC curve thus obtained was shown to 
be very close to the indecision line, suggesting that intraocular pressure measurement, as a stand-
alone test, cannot be a strong indicator for glaucomatous field loss.   
In the present study, intraocular pressure > 21 mmHg was considered to be a definitive sign for 
primary angle glaucoma. In the preliminary study, the positive likelihood ratio that was generated 
between the test “intraocular pressure >21mmHg” and the diagnosis of “primary open angle 
glaucoma” was 0.88. (see page 120). Likelihood  ratios that are close to 1 have minimal effect on post-
test probability (see 3.1 Decision Matrices) and therefore this shows that the test is of very little 
diagnostic value, concurring with the findings of Aspinall & Hill (154). 
ROC curves are useful for a single test/diagnosis combination as shown above. However, the current 
study deals with test outcomes in relation to many alternative diagnoses.  For this, each 
test/diagnoses combination would require the calculation of separate ROC curves. This was thought 
to be an unwieldy process. 
Figure 15  ROC curves (after Aspinal and Hill) 
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Gilchrist (100) applied a weighted coefficient “kappa” which is a measure of association between the 
test and the diagnosis and this gives an optimal test criterion as well as estimating the test quality. By 
adjusting the weighting “r”, kappa can be used to find the best screening method (when r=0) or the 
best diagnostic test (when r=1). However, to compare to the methods used in the present study, the 
weighting that gave the least false positive and least false negatives r=0.5 can be used.  
The weighted kappa was worked out (see Table 21) for the examples shown in section 3.4.2 The 
effect of Comorbidity, where Chi-square filtering was used to test the association between reduced 
vision and ametropia (Table 5)  and between reduced vision and pinguecula (Table 6),  
 
Reduced Vision/Uncorrected Ametropia 
k(0) 0.65 
k(0.5) 0.15 
k (1) 0.08 
  Reduced vision/ Pinguecula 
k(0) 0.01 
k(0.5) 0.02 
k(1) 0.33 
Table 21 Weighted kappa was worked out for two test/diagnosis combinations (reduced vision/uncorrected ametropia 
and reduced vision/pinguecula) for different values of "r".   
 
Note how reduced vision is a good test for screening for uncorrected ametropia, but not a good 
diagnostic test. For pinguecula, reduced vision is not a good screening test, yet appears to have a fair 
association as a diagnostic test. Recall that the positive likelihood ratios were similar for both tests 
(Reduced vision/Uncorrected ametropia LR+ = 2.2; Reduced vision/pinguecula LR+ = 1.6) suggesting 
that reduced vision was of equal diagnostic value for detecting uncorrected ametropia and 
pinguecula. So both likeliood ratios on their own and kappa can make spurious associations.  
However, in this study, more than one test/diagnosis association is being tested for the strength of 
that association. Kappa allows for only one test at a time and whether that test is suitable for 
screening or diagnosis, whereas the filtered Chi-square removes spurious association for a number of 
tests at a time.  
QROC curves (similar to ROC curves) determine the strength of a test/diagnosis association at 
different values of the test, by using the different sensitivity and specificity at different values to 
produce the QROC curve. In this respect, all the data has to be analysed to find the best cut-off value 
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for each test. Like the ROC curves this process was felt to be too cumbersome for the purposes of the 
current study. 
 Advantages of using the Chi-square filtering are 
 It can be incorporated into the naïve Bayesian sequential analysis, and can work in the 
“background” within the analysis,  
 It allows the use of multiple test criteria (such as age, the severity of symptoms and signs)   
which allows a “tailor-made” diagnosis for each person.  
Yet, the use of Chi-square filtering appears to be questionable when applied to all available data, and 
does not appear to justify the computational effort involved.  However, the use of Chi-square filtering 
does appear to make a worthwhile contribution when it comes to identifying “sensible” 
recommended tests to confirm diagnosis. Further work is required, especially when both positive and 
negative likelihoods ratios are used and where diagnoses without definitive tests occur, to see if Chi-
square filtering is a worthwhile addition to Bayesian analysis.    
The clinical records used for the analysis were created during routine eye examinations. Although 
only positive outcomes were assessed in this study, it is important to note that the clinical records did 
contain “negative” outcomes such as “anterior segment– normal”. Unfortunately, this type of 
recording of negative findings was deemed not to be specific enough for the purposes of this study. 
Ideally, each test item should have a positive or negative test outcome or otherwise an indicator that 
the test had not been carried out.  This study shows the importance of recording negative findings as 
a part of best practice.  
In clinical practice, a practitioner may well recognise a condition/disease due to experience and 
having done so, may not note all the signs leading to the diagnosis. In such cases, where information 
is incomplete, loss of accuracy may occur.   
Sadatsafavi et al (156) created a mathematical model to assess inter-observer agreement when using 
Bayesian analysis to assist in clinical diagnosis. 3 main sources of errors were cited in interpreting 
diagnostic findings using Bayes’ theorem: 
 pre-test probabilities (prevalences in the present study);  
 the misclassification of the test outcomes;  
  prior knowledge of the observer/clinician which can affect the decision making process. 
(156).  
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Although these findings were not applied to clinical practice, a similar finding was made in the 
present study. That is, where the clinician had prior knowledge (or experience), diagnoses were often 
made without recording the associated signs (see 6.3.1.3 Possible causes of reduced accuracy: lack of 
recorded signs), leading to a loss of accuracy.  
If sufficient further accuracy can be achieved with the above suggestions, naïve Bayesian analysis 
could be incorporated into practice software systems. This would create an element of artificial 
intelligence, assisting in clinical decision making and diagnostic test selection. Global use of such an 
“intelligent” system could base prevalence on entered details of the practice location and setting (i.e. 
primary or secondary care), as prevalence is dependent on the clinic location and setting (157). 
However, likelihood ratios would apply to any setting (as they are independent of prevalence). This 
“intelligent” system would update itself with continued input of clinical data (becoming a circular, 
sequential analysis). The potential here is vast as this would enable epidemiological surveillance on an 
unprecedented scale.  
In addition, an “intelligent” system within practice software could help to safeguard against missed 
diagnosis (that is, by suggesting the most appropriate tests to be carried out). In this manner, such a 
system would have legal value in that it could provide an evidence base for “best or current practice” 
that would support legal defence in cases of malpractice. The resulting reduction of legal actions 
might, in turn, reduce legal costs and the cost of professional indemnity insurance.  
Bayes’ theorem has been used within the courts of law (25), (86). However, Bayesian principles may 
be difficult to understand for the layman and, recently, in an appeal against a murder conviction in 
the UK, a judge ruled against the use of Bayesian arguments “unless the underlying statistics are 
‘firm’” (158).  Bayesian analysis has always been a method of drawing inference from limited data; 
drawing conclusions from the effects about the cause (see 2.2 Early History of Bayes’ Theorem). Thus 
it appears that the judge has ruled against what may be the best method of obtaining statistical 
inference from limited data, not necessarily because the statistical methods themselves are flawed, 
but because it is difficult for the layman to understand the principles involved in Bayesian analysis.  
Another potential advantage of “intelligent” systems is the possibility that they could increase 
efficiency through better use of optometric assistants. Here, “intelligent” systems could be used by 
optical assistants to elicit the presenting symptoms from which the most appropriate diagnostic tests 
would automatically be identified. The optometrist would then concentrate on the recommended 
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diagnostic tests. This would save time by providing the most efficient problem-orientated eye 
examination directed to the resolution of the presenting symptoms.  
Would such an “intelligent” system lead to “deskilling” of the optometrist? A comparable situation 
was experienced when soft contact lenses improved in design and quality. As they became more 
popular, many optometrists thought they would lose this potentially lucrative market to unskilled 
personnel. However, the reality showed that optometrists were facing new challenges, and therefore 
had to learn new skills to deal with the complications posed by the extensive use of soft contact 
lenses (159) (160) (161). Thus, the optometrist should not fear deskilling but look to different 
challenges and to a new level of optometry.  
Such “intelligent” systems also have the potential of helping new optometrists make the best possible 
decisions based on the symptoms and signs that they have elicited from the patient. Similarly such a 
tool can help more seasoned optometrists make decisions more confidently and provide the evidence 
base to facilitate the training of younger colleagues. Bayesian analysis is a powerful decision-making 
tool allowing the clinician to consider treatments based on rigorous evidence tailored to the patient’s 
individual requirements (162). The use of Bayesian analysis can also inform problem-based learning, 
which tends to encourage an inquisitive style of learning as opposed to the more traditional, short 
term, rote memorisation. This encourages the learner (be it a student or a seasoned practitioner) to 
become a pro-active, independent thinker, with good problem solving skills. (163). This would 
harmonise well with the current General Optical Council continuing professional requirements for 
registration to practise in the UK (164). A further consideration would be to develop problem 
orientated clinical records in which Bayesian decision making is part of the record and can help to 
identify when a test should be carried out and when treatment should be started (165). Such 
examination of probabilities can rule out unnecessary tests, making medical care more cost and time 
efficient (166). Clinical records should be user friendly, allow data analysis for the purposes of self-
evaluation and learning, enable the formulation of public health policies and research, with strict 
parameters for patient confidentiality and comprehensive data recording (167). 
Bayesian analysis in medicine has advanced considerably since Jerome Cornfield’s discovery linking 
lung cancer and smoking (58) and, especially in the last 30 years, allowing modelling where flexibility 
and innovation are desired, where models can be continually changed according to data available 
(168) (169). Bayesian analysis applied to optometry can assist in decision-making especially where 
data may be incomplete or equivocal. 
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Adoption of Bayesian thinking in optometry can allow the eye examination to become more problem 
orientated and more efficient. Using Bayesian analysis with electronic record keeping can assist in 
meeting the challenges of the Global Action Plan for Universal Eye Health (3), by assisting collection 
and analysis of epidemiological data (170), formulating public health policies for resource and 
infrastructure management, supporting training of eye care personnel (171) and providing an 
evidence based clinical support guidelines where there may be lack of human and infrastructure 
resources. 
This study has shown the value of data collection from primary eye care in formulating an evidence 
base, in order to guide the profession and the practitioner alike.  
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Appendix III  
Ophthalmic Procedures  
 
Ophthalmic Procedure  Associated Signs used in analysis  
1: VA Reduced VA on presentation  
2: CT Heterotropia  
  Heterophoria 
3: FD Fixation disparity 
4: Pupils Not reactive to light 
5: Lids External (eyelid) - lump/swelling 
6: Tears External (lacrimal apparatus) - TBUT ≤10s 
7: Conjunctiva External (conjunctiva) - lump/nodule 
  External (conjunctiva) - winged mass 
  External (conjunctiva) - redness - bulbar 
  External (conjunctiva) - redness - bulbar - diffuse 
  External (conjunctiva) - redness - bulbar - diffuse - mild 
  External (conjunctiva) -  redness - bulbar - diffuse - severe 
  External (conjunctiva) - redness - bulbar - sectoral 
  External (conjunctiva) - redness - palpebral 
  External (conjunctiva) - discharge - clear watery 
  External (conjunctiva) - discharge - yellow pus like 
  External (conjunctiva) - papillae - small 
  External (conjunctiva) - papillae - cobblestone 
  External (conjunctival) - foreign body 
8: Cornea External (cornea) -  foreign body 
  External (cornea) - fluorescein staining - punctate 
  External (cornea) - fluorescein staining - diffuse 
  External (cornea) - fluorescein staining - foreign body tracks 
  External (cornea) - limbal ring opacity 
  External (cornea) - haze 
  External (cornea) - lesion 
  External (cornea) - scar 
9: Lens Internal (media) - crystalline lens - cloudy/yellowing  
  Internal (media) - crystalline lens - small white flake like opacities 
  Internal (media) - pseudophakia - opaque capsule 
10: Vitreous Internal (media) - vitreous - floaters 
  Internal (media) - hazy view of fundus 
11: Optic disc Internal (optic disc) - nasal displacement of blood vessels 
  Internal (optic disc) - tilted 
  Internal (optic disc) - CDR>0.7 
  Internal (optic disc) -intraocular difference of CDR >= 0.2 
  Internal (optic disc) - well defined margins 
  Internal (optic disc) - pallor 
  Internal (optic disc) - temporal pallor 
12:Retinal Vasculature Internal (Retinal B/Vs) - AV nipping 
13: Fundus Internal(fundus) - haemorrhage - small 
  Internal(fundus) - cotton wool spots 
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  Internal(fundus)  - exudates 
14: Macula Internal(macula) - pigment clumping 
  Internal(macula) - hole 
  Internal(macula) - oedema 
  Internal(macula) - scar 
15: Rx Refraction - uncorrected 
16. Add Near add determination - uncorrected  
17: IOP Tonometry - IOP >21mmHg 
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Appendix IV 
Comparison of LR+ between the preliminary study and the main study  
 Preliminary Study  min LR+ max LR+ 
average 
LR+ 
weighted average 
(= prevalence x 
average LR+ ) 
Uncorrected ametropia  0.093233283 137,038.40 9136.89815 7,273.54 
Uncorrected presbyopia  0.087807903 449,803.38 29988.3724 9,532.17 
Dry eye  0.816783297 27.32 3.12663961 0.43 
Cataract 1 47.54 5.19562989 0.58 
Allergic Conjuctivitis  0.076248892 115.18 8.57181606 0.59 
Pinguecula 1 174.19 12.6469705 0.25 
Diabetic retinopathy 1 175.44 12.751062 0.18 
Uncompensated heterophoria 0.078588283 707,766.16 47185.2823 597.28 
New Primary Open Angle Glaucoma 0.078588283 1.00 0.8771451 0.00 
Macula hole  0.118009615 707.94 48.0705282 0.07 
  
  
    
      Average = 1,740.51 
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Appendix IV continued 
 
 Main study  min LR+  Max LR+ 
Average 
LR+ 
weighted average 
(= prevalence x 
average LR+ ) 
Uncorrected ametropia  0.04 142,001.75 1,353.34 1,083.05 
Uncorrected presbyopia  0.00 461,000.16 4,391.73 1,544.21 
Uncompensated heterophoria 0.06 707,766.16 6,748.00 28.47 
Heterotropia 0.09 702,914.15 7,532.82 84.76 
Allergic Dermatitis 0.06 177.16 2.56 0.01 
Blepharitis 0.00 140.95 4.05 0.03 
Stye 0.06 176.66 4.17 0.02 
Dry eye  0.20 27.32 1.67 0.26 
Allergic Conjuctivitis  0.12 115.18 2.39 0.15 
Bacterial Conjunctivitis 0.06 318,188.51 3,033.49 46.93 
Viral Conjunctivitis 0.06 117.98 3.27 0.01 
Pterygium 0.23 586.74 7.23 0.20 
Pinguecula 0.00 174.19 2.67 0.05 
Subconjunctival haemorrhage 0.06 75.73 1.83 0.01 
Foreign body on conjunctiva 0.06 709,293.42 6,755.71 9.50 
Contact lens associated GPC 0.06 70.69 1.86 0.01 
Contact lens associated red eye  0.06 44.29 1.88 0.01 
Corneal arcus 1.00 99.41 3.24 0.07 
Corneal abrasion 0.08 78,060.88 744.43 9.42 
Foreign body on cornea 0.06 709,293.42 6,755.71 9.50 
Cataract - early 1.00 21.24 1.29 0.06 
Cataract - posterior pole 1.00 36.42 2.11 0.06 
Cataract - cortical 0.07 70,156.27 1,337.56 18.81 
Cataract - nuclear 0.06 106.01 2.32 0.01 
Primary open angle glaucoma 0.07 140,242.45 1,337.70 18.81 
Ocular hypertension 0.06 64.42 1.18 0.00 
Normal tension glaucoma  0.07 141.14 2.13 0.01 
Anterior Ischaemic optic neuropathy 0.06 709,293.42 6,757.40 9.50 
Optic neuropathy (nutritional) 0.06 708,647.85 6,751.85 18.99 
Diabetic retinopathy 0.08 311.70 5.64 0.07 
Hypertensive retinopathy 0.06 177.28 2.23 0.00 
Retinitis pigmentosa 0.06 354.15 3.95 0.01 
Diabetic maculopathy 0.07 564.15 7.12 0.05 
Macula hole  0.06 707.94 7.45 0.02 
ARMD  0.06 708.58 9.54 0.01 
  
  
    
      Average= 82.38 
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Appendix V 
Comparison of recommended tests with and without Chi-square 
Diagnosis  Best recommended test as identified by LR+  Score  
Best recommended  test as identified by LR+ 
without use of Chi-square filtration  Score 
Uncorrected ametropia  Refraction - uncorrected 5 Refraction - uncorrected 5 
Uncorrected presbyopia  Near add determination - uncorrected  5 Near add determination - uncorrected  5 
Uncompensated heterophoria Fixation disparity 5 Fixation disparity 5 
Heterotropia Cover Test - heterotropia  5 Cover Test - heterotropia  5 
Allergic Dermatitis 
External (conjunctiva) - discharge - yellow 
pus like 1 
External (conjunctiva) - discharge - yellow pus 
like 1 
Blepharitis External (eyelid) - lump/swelling 4 External (eyelid) - lump/swelling 4 
Stye External (eyelid) - lump/swelling 5 External (eyelid) - lump/swelling 5 
Dry eye  External (lacrimal apparatus) - TBUT ≤10s 5   1 
Allergic Conjuctivitis  External (conjunctiva) - papillae - small 5 External (conjunctiva) - papillae - small 5 
Bacterial Conjunctivitis External (conjunctiva) - redness - palpebral 4 External (conjunctiva) - redness - palpebral 4 
Viral Conjunctivitis 
External (conjunctiva) -  redness - bulbar - 
diffuse - severe 5 
External (conjunctiva) -  redness - bulbar - diffuse 
- severe 3 
Pterygium External (conjunctiva) - winged mass 5 External (conjunctiva) - winged mass 5 
Pinguecula External (conjunctiva) - lump/nodule 5 External (conjunctiva) - lump/nodule 5 
Subconjunctival haemorrhage 
External (conjunctiva) - redness - bulbar - 
sectoral 5 
External (conjunctiva) - redness - bulbar - 
sectoral 5 
Foreign body on conjunctiva External (conjunctival) - foreign body 5 External (conjunctival) - foreign body 5 
Contact lens associated Giant 
papillary conjunctivitis  
External (conjunctiva) - papillae - 
cobblestone 5 External (conjunctiva) - papillae - cobblestone 5 
Contact lens associated red eye  
External (conjunctiva) - redness - bulbar - 
diffuse - mild 4 
External (conjunctiva) - redness - bulbar - diffuse 
- mild 4 
Corneal arcus External (cornea) - limbal ring opacity 5 External (cornea) - limbal ring opacity 5 
Corneal abrasion External (cornea) -  foreign body 3 External (cornea) -  foreign body 3 
Foreign body on cornea External (cornea) -  foreign body 5 External (cornea) -  foreign body 5 
Cataract - early 
Internal (media) - crystalline lens - 
cloudy/yellowing  5 
Internal (media) - crystalline lens - 
cloudy/yellowing  5 
Cataract - posterior pole Internal (media) - hazy view of fundus 4 Internal(fundus) - cotton wool spots 1 
Cataract - cortical 
External (conjunctiva) - discharge - clear 
watery 1 External (conjunctiva) - discharge - clear watery 1 
Cataract - nuclear Internal (media) - hazy view of fundus 4 Internal (media) - hazy view of fundus 4 
Primary open angle glaucoma Pupils - not reactive to light 1 Pupils - not reactive to light 1 
Ocular hypertension Tonometry - IOP >21mmHg 5 Tonometry - IOP >21mmHg 5 
Normal tension glaucoma  
Internal (optic disc) - nasal displacement of 
blood vessels 4 
Internal (optic disc) - nasal displacement of blood 
vessels 4 
Anterior Ischaemic optic 
neuropathy Internal (optic disc) - well defined margins 5 Internal (optic disc) - well defined margins 5 
Optic neuropathy (nutritional) Internal (optic disc) - temporal pallor 5 Internal (optic disc) - temporal pallor 5 
Diabetic retinopathy Internal(fundus)  - exudates 4 Internal(fundus)  - exudates 4 
Hypertensive retinopathy   1 Near add determination - uncorrected  1 
Retinitis pigmentosa Internal(macula) - pigment clumping 5 Internal(macula) - pigment clumping 5 
Diabetic maculopathy Internal(fundus)  - exudates 5 Internal(fundus)  - exudates 5 
Macula hole  Internal(macula) - hole 5 Internal(macula) - hole 5 
Age-related macular degeneration - 
dry Internal(macula) - pigment clumping 5   1 
 
